Chapter 2

2.2 A PROBLEM FOR THE U.S.

In early 1964 the Pentagon decided to pay closer attention to its
relationship with the Chilean armed forces, repairing and
reconditioning them in case conditions continued to show a trend
toward the danger of a worker and peasant subversion in Chile.

For the American generals in the Southern Command in the Canal Zone
(who operate at a cost of $136.5 million per annum, with twelve
generals and admirals commanding 10,500 troops), in charge of
"protecting and administering" the programs of military aid to
Latin America, the "Chile case" was, in 1964, a potential problem
area.

The Chilean political and economic situation was leaning toward a
serious confrontation between the workers and Chilean and American
business interests. It was the last year of the presidency of a
representative of the Chilean oligopolies (Jorge Alessandri
Rodriguez, president of the Paper and Box Manufacturers, a trade
association uniting more than $500 million worth of Chilean and
North American capital -This refers to the 'activo fijo' (fixed
assets) of more than sixty industrial, agricultural, financial, and
commercial enterprises belonging to the oligarchic clan Matte-
Alessandri), and there were clear signs of economic disaster: an
inflation rate of over 46 percent after a rate of 8 percent in
1961, 14 percent in 1962, and 45 percent in 1963. Unemployment was
over 7 percent, that is, more than 200,000 unemployed out of a work
force of about 2.8 million Chileans. The foreign debt had reached
$1,896 million ($1,629 million of which were already expended
credits and $267 million in credits outstanding). The infant
mortality rate was 10.2 per thousand.

The economic gulf between the classes was extreme: 1 million
peasants and workers lived on a per capita income of $380; 60,000
landholders, industrialists, and administrative managers enjoyed a
mean income of $10,450 per annum.

In statistical terms, the 1964 situation was as follows, according
to the studies of the Office of National Planning (Oficina de
Planificacion Nacional -ODEPLAN- created by the Frei
administration):

Wage earners, who made up 50 percent of the work force, received 21
percent of the total annual income.

Office workers, who made up 22.8 percent of the work force,
received 27.2 percent of annual income.

The self-employed, who comprised 21.8 percent of the work force,
received 17.6 percent of annual income.

Contractors and bondholders, who were only 1.4 percent of the work
force, absorbed 26.4 percent of the income.

The remainder of the income (7.8 percent) went to the government,
through its properties and direct taxes.2

Economic discrepancies were much higher outside the cities, where
25 percent of the active Chilean population worked. The 3 percent
of agricultural landowners considered to be 'latifundistas' (this
word has no real English equivalent. It designates the owners of
vast amounts of agricultural land, most of which is uncultivated)
appropriated 37 percent of the income generated in that sector,
while 71 percent of rural families received only 33 percent of the
income.

To maintain this status quo, the successive Radical and
Conservative governments between 1945 and 1964 had structured a
repressive military apparatus (the Military Police Corp, or
Carabineros) which, when they threatened to be overwhelmed by the
workers' struggle, would be aided by the armed forces' three
branches, principally the Army. However, the basic means of
"maintaining the social order" was political deception and
suppression  of labour unions. (Between 1945 and 1964 the unionized
population of Chile had shrunk by more than 20 percent)

Political deception was reflected in the fact that the alliance of
the Conservative and so-called Liberal parties comprised 30 percent
of the electoral body. The Radical party (which represented
government officials and industrialists with ties to the North
American copper companies, plus some 'latifundistas') made up 20
percent of the electoral body. The Christian Democratic party,
which began to be important only in the late fifties, had 15
percent of the vote (it had broken off from the Conservative party
in the thirties; in 1964 it was composed of the major industrial
interests and a class of highest-level technicians tied to the
Chilean as well as the North American oligopolies).

By early 1964 the coalition of Socialist and Communist parties had
amassed 25 percent of the total vote and showed a consistent
tendency to recruit its sympathizers from among the hundreds of
thousands of workers stricken by poverty and unemployment. The
workers were pressing for a law establishing  a farm workers'
union, for raises in pay, for an easement to permit labourers' and
office workers' unions, for an agrarian reform law, and, most
important, for the nationalization of the copper, iron and
saltpeter mines, which were controlled by U.S. enterprises, as well
as for the nationalization of the telephone and power utilities in
the capital and the central zone, also in the hands of North
Americans.

Thus the 1964 presidential race between Salvador Allende (supported
by a Socialist-Communist alliance, plus the greater part of the
Radical party at the lowest levels) and Eduardo Frei (head of the
Christian Democratic party, plus the Conservative-Liberal alliance
and a small segment of the Radical party) was conducted in an
atmosphere of violent anti-imperialism, a general agreement about
the urgent need for a law of agrarian reform, and a political
mobilization of the masses unprecedented in the history of the
country. The Christian Democrats, taking up the banner of political
deception from the Radical party, even suggested the need for a
"revolution" but "in freedom", which would involve the
expropriation of the LATIFUNDISTAS, bank reform, the expropriation
of some gigantic Chilean industrial consortia that were privately
owned, tax reform, and a "new agreement" with the Anaconda and
Kennecott copper companies.

The situation threatened to become critical for the dominant groups
in Chilean society, both North American and national. From 1945
until 1964, the U.S. government and the Anaconda, Kennecott,
International Telephone & Telegraph, and American Foreign Power
companies, mainly, had enormous influence over the Chilean
government and the Conservative, Liberal, and, above all, Radical
members of the Chamber of Deputies and Senators. For instance, the
Radical President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, after leaving the
presidency in 1948, was named president of the Chilean subsidiary
of Radio Corporation of America and vice-president of the French
and Italian Bank. Between 1948 and 1964, Gabriel Gonzalez Videla
had risen from being a lawyer of modest means to one of the richest
men in Chile. Another typical case is that of Rodolfo Michels, the
most important man in the Radical leadership during the same years.
Michels was in charge of administering the funds annually
contributed by the Anaconda Company to finance the Radical Party.
All of the projects for laws on "foreign investment", and copper,
iron, saltpeter, telephone, and electricity contracts, before being
presented to Congress by the Radical administrators and their
successors, were first discussed in the Anaconda offices at the
Chuquicamata mine. When Michels "retired" from political life and
was named vice-president of Anaconda in Chile, he was replaced by
the "treasurer" of the Radical party, Constantino Tallar, who at
the same time was the "contractor" of Anaconda's residential and
industrial construction work.3

In 1964, with radicalism splintered, and faced with strong
grassroots support for Allende's leftist coalition, the U.S
government and its multinational corporations were in a quandary:
whom could they use to look out for their interests? The Radicals
had no chance to pull together a coherent group with real access to
La Moneda and the Parliament. Inquiries were sent to Chile: Robert
Haldeman, president of Braden Copper (a Kennecott affiliate), which
held El Teniente copper mine concession in O'Higgins Province, by
late 1963 had had conversations with the head of the Christian
Democrats, Eduardo Frei (a lawyer serving the oligopolistic group
of Osvaldo de Castro, closely linked to the American company Anglo
Lautaro), who had already declared his candidacy for the 1964
presidential elections. He had requested financial aid from
Kennecott for his campaign in exchange for a formal promise not to
nationalize the copper mines and to formulate a technical agreement
that would mutually benefit Chile and Kennecott. Haldeman informed
his superiors that "in my opinion" Eduardo Frei is a "person to be
trusted", who "believes in what he says". Kennecott, Anglo Lautaro,
and ITT (whose executive team in Chile included one of the most
important men in the Christian Democratic leadership, Guillermo
Correa Fuenzalida, who was in turn the chief executive of the
financial-industrial group of Banco de Chile, which managed capital
assets of more than $600 million) as well as other multinationals
and the U.S. government were interested in the results of the 1964
presidential campaign, and believed that Frei's election would be
to their benefit.4

Twenty million dollars to finance Frei's campaign were collected
and administered by the International Development Foundation, a
U.S. government agency. The plan was to accede to popular pressure
for agrarian reform and farm workers' unions, as well as to reach
"new accords" that would look like nationalizations with Anglo
Lautaro for saltpeter, American Foreign Power for electricity, ITT
for the telephones, and Anaconda and Kennecott for copper.

David Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank advised on the
economic steps to take "to guarantee measures favouring capital
proceeding from the U.S." "Coordinator" between the Rockefellers
and Eduardo Frei was civil engineer Raul Saez (as of July 11, 1974,
Chile's Minister of Economic Coordination, a post especially
created for him).5

The $20 million was not a bad investment for the United States.
Frei won the presidential elections with 56 percent of the vote.
But Allende raised his percentage of the vote from approximately 25
to 39 percent. This was worrisome to American interests. American
University in Washington D.C., began an in-depth investigation of
Chilean society, inserted into what came to be called "Plan
Camelot". They recommended a series of measures to "avoid the peril
of popular subversion in Chile". These measures revolved around a
refitting of the Chilean armed forces' capacity to cope "in an
extreme situation".

At about this time, Roy Hansen, a sociologist at the University
of California, was preparing a scholarly study (PhD) on the subject
of the Chilean Armed forces high command.6

Roy Hansen arrived in Chile in late 1964 and made contact with
Alvaro Bunster at the University of Chile (the latter would also be
drafted for Plan Camelot; curiously, he was later appointed
ambassador to Great Britain during Allende's administration).
Through Bunster's sister Ximena he obtained the status of
investigative sociologist. Hansen's scientific operations were, of
course, centred on the Chilean armed forces. For this purpose, he
got in touch with the secretary general of the Chilean Army's
Academy of War, Colonel Rene Schneider Chereau. Colonel Schneider
gave Hansen unlimited access to the Academy of War's library and
study plans, and arranged personal interviews with the corps of
generals.

As Hansen's study progressed, he discovered that the Chilean Army
had a superstructure suited to a far larger corps than the one they
managed ( one general to every 1,000 men, that is, 32 generals to
approximately 32,000 men, and one colonel to every 200 men. When he
also discovered that the "decisive force" in the country's military
system was the Army, he concentrated his  investigation on it. The
result of Hansen's work, which the Chilean Army labelled "secret",
was entitled MILITARY CULTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE: A STUDY
OF THE CHILEAN ARMY. A copy of his study was shelved in the
"classified" section of the Chilean Army's Academy of War library,
another went to the University of California sociology library, and
the rest went to the Pentagon.7

In 1964, in Roy Hansen's view, the Chilean armed forces command 
elite were clearly in danger of disintegration as a result of their
total lack of participation in the country's important decisions.
In spite of the fact that the opinion of the Chilean armed forces'
command had been decisive in the country's political development,
for the last forty years they had been used merely as a
"terrorizing specter". At the same time, they were given an
undignified third-order role in the system of government and, what
is more, were placed in sixth or seventh rank economically. Hansen
said that since the 1924 military coup (by the Santiago garrison to
force the oligarchic majority in Parliament to pass reform laws for
the workers' salaries and health and retirement benefits, to
prevent a "Bolshevist insurrection" of the masses), the Chilean
military elite had not found it necessary to intervene directly in
politics, and this had had the effect of relegating them to the
attic in successive civil administrations.

Hansen "foresaw" that the high commands, to protect themselves from
further decline, would have a marked tendency in the near future to
take an active part in politics and in national decisions made by
the controlling circles.


Investigating what the generals thought about the rest of the
society they lived in, Hansen reached these conclusions: The
generals had a profound contempt for civilians, whom they
considered useless, corrupt, and ignorant. Some of them believed
that the Parliamentarians, the civil politicians, and many
officials high in the state's hierarchy "had no idea what Chile 
is, how it must be defended from external aggressions and internal
subversion". It was also the generals' opinion that "the
Fatherland" could be defended only by the armed forces, because
civil politicians were incompetent. They felt that civilians held
the military in contempt but would turn to it whenever they were
unable to control the "subversion of the masses". Hansen's
statistics on the political opinions of the high command
were the following: 10 percent were right-wing, 80 percent were
centrist, and 10 percent were left-wing. But he added the
explanation that for the Chilean high commands, "leftist" meant
Frei's Christian Democratic program of agrarian and banking reform
and new contracts with the North American companies. For the
generals, the coalition of political parties that had supported
Salvador Allende was the "extreme left" and none of them supported
it.

In the first half of 1965, when the Pentagon wanted to put into 
practice a part of its long-term plan to prepare the Chilean armed
forces as reserve forces for maintaining the structure of Chilean
middle-class society in the case of a disaster with the civil 
politicians, there were serious problems. This part was Plan
Camelot, whose intention was to study, classify, and weigh all "the
elements of social, political, and economic pressure against the
established system" to achieve "a system to control those
pressures". When it began to be applied, the militants in the
leftist parties at the University of Chile denounced it. The
scandal was so bad that even the Christian Democrats, for
appearances' sake, supported an investigation in Parliament. The
leftists in Parliament, plus a segment of the Christian Democrats,
described Plan Camelot as a "foreign power's plan of espionage
against Chile", and Washington itself was forced to issue a
statement in June 1965 that "we have suggested to the corresponding
authorities that the application of Plan Camelot in Chile and
Colombia be suspended".8

But the work in the Chilean armed forces was not suspended. The
U.S. military mission (whose offices are inside the Ministry of 
Defense in Santiago, off limits for Chilean civilians) began 
"advising" the Academy of War curriculum and recommended that all
upper-class men at the Bernardo O'Higgins Military School (which
trains officers for the Army) and the Captain Avalos Aviation 
School (which trains officers for the Air Force) ought to spend
a forty-day instruction period at the U.S. Army's Southern Command
in the Panama Canal Zone.

This "recommendation" from the Pentagon to the Chilean high command
was put into operation in 1968 by the then director of the Bernardo
O'Higgins Military School, already the Pentagon's "trusted man" in
the Army, Brigadier General Rene Schneider Chereau, who had been so
helpful to Roy Hansen.

At the same time, Schneider, a professor in the Academy of War, was
active in introducing new courses on economics, politics,
government administration, foreign commerce, the politics of
industrialization, the history of the Chilean political parties,
agrarian and urban reform, banking policies, and so on. That is to
say, an entire  curriculum in "public administration" was intended
as an important part in the instruction of the Chilean Army's
future generals. In the same way, intensive studies of Marxism were
begun through courses on Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung.9

From 1968, Professor Schneider, after long work sessions with the
members of the U.S. military mission in Santiago, began to develop
"the modern theory of national security", which consisted of 
maintaining that the real meaning of the phrase "the armed forces
are the guarantors of national security" had a double character:
security with respect to external enemies, and security with
respect to internal enemies, and that in "the present conditions of
Chile" the "internal" enemies of national security are much more
dangerous, real, and latent than the "external" enemies. And who
are those "internal" enemies? According to Pentagon theory as
transmitted through General Rene Schneider, they are all those who,
taking advantage of popular discontent resulting from social
injustices and abuses by the possessors of wealth, are trying to
remove Chile from the "Christian Western world" in which it was
born and is destined to continue living. Among these "internal"
enemies, naturally, those "who advocate Marxist socialism" hold the
place of honour.

Similar courses and theories were being developed at the same time
in the Navy, Air Force, and military police, all under the aegis of
the "North American intelligence advisers" and all through senior
officers like Brigadier General Rene Schneider Chereau.

While the Pentagon gave top priority in Chile to the betterment of
its relations with the native armed forces, Frei's government was
too preoccupied with its relations with U.S. companies to heed the
general's material requests. But three years of preparation to be
"masters in the arts of war and civil government" had prompted the
generals to ask for a larger share of the wealth generated by the
work of the Chilean labourers and peasants.

In 1969 a new social and economic crisis began to emerge. Five
years had passed since Frei's call for a "revolution in freedom",
and its failure was all too evident. Economic development had been
stagnating, with growth of the GDP dropping in 1967 to 0 percent;
in 1968, .6 percent; the projection for 1969 did not look better
than .7 percent. Food prices were rising: in 1967, a rise of 14.5
percent; in 1968, 25.5 percent, and the 1969 projection was 30.7
percent. In the same year, the mean remuneration of 1,300,000 urban
and agricultural workers was 35 times LESS than the mean income of
some 62,000 employers and landowners. Agrarian reform, which had
promised to create 100,000 new landholders, had been able to
expropriate less than one-third of the large estates. The foreign
debt had risen from $1,896 million in 1964 to a total of $2,765
million in 1969, while U.S. and other foreign enterprises were
taking out of the country, through profits, depreciations,
amortization, and interest payments, MORE THAN ONE MILLION
DOLLARS A DAY. During Alessandri's administration (1958-1964), this
annual outflow was $170 million, but before the last year of Frei's
administration, it had gone up to more than $344 million. Andres
Zaldivar, Frei's Treasury Minister, reported in November 1969 that
cash outflow to foreign countries would reach $450 million for
fiscal 1969. On the other hand, the Christian Democratic government
had paid $186 million to American Foreign Power, holder of the
Chilean Electric Company, for machinery that was worth less than
$40 million; it had promised $1 billion to Anaconda for a "pacted
nationalization" of Chuquicamata, the largest copper mine in the
world, for equipment that was worth less than $170 million. A
similar accord had been reached with Kennecott, paying $80 million
for 51 percent of the installations whose value did not exceed $70
million in the El Teniente mine ( this subject is treated in
greater detail in my book "El Imperialismo Yanqui en Chile". The
figures were cited in a constitutional accusation against Eduardo
Frei in June 1973, which was not successful because there was a
government minority in both houses of Parliament).

All of this, made known to the Chilean people by leftist
journalists and nationalistic publications, had provoked a vast
anti-imperialist sentiment which was being expressed in constant
agitation by labourers, peasants, office workers, and students,
demanding the expulsion of the U.S. copper companies from Chile and
the expropriation of all industrial enterprises with a majority of
capital held by U.S. companies, which had been producing the
phenomenon of "industrial denationalization" in Chile during the
Frei administration.

The peasants' struggle for land had gone to the extreme of
appropriating some large estates by force, while farm worker
unionization had grown from 3,000 peasants in 1964 to nearly
120,000 in the last month of 1969. In the cities, workers' strikes
for better wages were triple those during the previous
administration. Professors and university and high school students
were constantly agitating for educational reform on the upper
levels. The situation was explosive enough for Eduardo Frei to ask
Nelson Rockefeller not to visit Chile on the Latin-American tour
that resulted in his famous report on Latin America. In this
report, Rockefeller would recommend that the U.S. government
promote the taking power in Latin-American countries by the
progressive body of officers of the new generation, since they were
the most coherent organization in Latin-American societies. The
"progressive body of officers" to whom Rockefeller was referring
included the high commands training in the Chilean Army's Academy
of War under the advice and supervision of the U.S. military
mission.10

Around mid-1969, in the middle of this social ferment, Brigadier
General Roberto Viaux Marambio, commander of the First Army
Division stationed in Antofagasta, solicited "the opinion of the
young officers" (colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, and
captains) and wrote a letter of petition to the Army's commander in
chief, Sergio Castillo Aranguiz, to be presented to Eduardo Frei.
General Viaux's letter said that "national security and internal
peace in our country" depended on the armed forces, and "in our
judgement" the Frei administration, like its predecessors, had not
concerned itself with keeping a modern army in working order, "well
equipped and taking real part in important decisions". The letter
demanded that a new government policy toward the armed forces be
put into effect, that senior officers' salaries be adjusted to
conform to "their high social status and national responsibility"
(in the letter, Viaux complained that "a general of the Republic
earns less than a competent worker at the Chuquicamata copper
mine", which was true), that adequate war materiel be purchased,
and that the higher echelons of the military hierarchy be given a
prominent participatory role in the economic, political, and social
development of Chile.

General Viaux was confident that his letter would lead to a new
dialogue with President Frei, because he had discussed it
beforehand with the head of the Army's General Staff, Division
General Rene Schneider Chereau. The letter had even made
suggestions about the "participatory" role of the generals in the
economic and political life of the country.

Frei, however, did not listen to Rene Schneider, but he did listen
to Sergio Castillo, the commander in chief of the Army, an intimate
personal friend and a "Freista" above all else. General Roberto
Viaux was relieved of his command of the First Division on
Saturday, October 18, 1969, and recalled to Santiago. On Tuesday,
October 21, Viaux awoke as head of a military insurrection
localized in the Tacna Regiment in Santiago, with the support of
the Junior Officers' School, the Academy of War, and part of the
2nd Armored Regiment. At noon on October 21, it was clear to the
reporters covering the incident that General Viaux was counting on
the covert support and simpathy of the majority of Santiago's
officer corps, and that, technically, if Viaux suggested it, there
was nothing to prevent the overthrow of Eduardo Frei and his
replacement by a military government without a shot being fired.
However, after a phone conversation with the head of the Army
General Staff, Rene Schneider, General Viaux issued a statement in
which he emphasized that "my movement is not against the President
of the Republic," but rather was a last resort "to call attention"
to the necessity of putting the Army in the place it deserved.

The next day, October 22, General Viaux ended his rebellion, having
elicited the following concessions: The commander in chief of the
Army, General Sergio Castillo, would retire and be replaced by
Division General Rene Schneider Chereau. General Viaux accepted
forced retirement for himself, since General Schneider's presence
as commander in chief guaranteed that his petitions would be heard.

General Schneider forced Frei to carry out part of Viaux's original
petition: in January 1970, the generals' salaries were raised from
an equivalent of six times the minimum wage to twelve times the
minimum wage. (The minimum wage is fixed by law each year for state
employees and private enterprise.) That is, the generals became
part of the 2 percent of Chilean households with the highest
income. They had belonged to the 10 percent with the highest income
before. The military budget was raised by 50 percent for the
following fiscal year, and plans to expand the number of officers
in the three branches of the armed forces, the military police, and
the civilian investigatory police were studied. (These plans were
not put into effect until 1971, under Allende's administration.)

It was agreed that for their part the corps of Army generals would
study long- and short-term "plans of action" to put into practice
General Viaux's demand that "the armed forces be given a real
responsibility in solving national problems". During 1970 this plan
was deferred by the generals themselves so they could concentrate
on the means of intervening "in search of social peace", should the
political struggle for the presidency erupt into violent
confrontations between the various political factions, a situation
that kept threatening throughout the year until September 4, the
day of the presidential elections.
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[2] The remaining 4 percent of the work force is taken up by the
so-called domestic employees, mainly peasant women who work in the
houses of the middle and the upper bourgeoisie. Their salaries are
so low that they are not included in the national accounts. (Facts
taken from "Antecedentes sobre el desarrollo chileno 1960-1970",
ODEPLAN, 1971, 30-32, pp. 43, 45)

[3] The greater part of the papers that indicated payments had been
received by Gabriel Gonzalez Videla from the American consortia
were published in the Chilean magazine VISTAZO in November and
December 1962 and July 1964; in my articles "La Penetracion
Norteamericana en Chile" in CAUSA ML, Nos. 1-9; and in my series
"La Historia Sucia de los Politicos Democratas" in PURO CHILE 
March 15-April 7, 1973. A similar case was that of Rodolfo Michels,
which was so scandalous that he was expelled from the Radical party
in 1964, when the leftists  gained control of this political group;
they were later to support Allende's candidacy in 1970. Michels was
thrown out for "carrying on illegal relations with a foreign
company, Anaconda." But the right wing regained control of the
party, and relations with Anaconda were reestablished (see ibid.)

[4] When the copper mines were nationalized in July 1971, Robert
Haldeman left Chile. In his offices at the El Teniente mine,
documents were found attesting to conversations and agreements
involving state property and votes in the Chilean Parliament, in
the form of correspondence between Chileans and Haldeman and his
superiors in the Kennecott Company. There were 70,000 pages of
documents. MAYORIA, a magazine, published copies of 100 of these
documents from December 1971 to January 1972; these reproduced the
conversations between Frei and Haldeman in 1963, Haldeman's report
on Frei, and documents of money paid to journalists, members of
Parliament, and politicians to proselytize for American companies
and their tax agreement in Chile. Raul Morales Adriazola, a
rightist senator, was called into court for this, but the Appellate
Court, although it accepted the genuineness of the documents,
declared itself incompetent to judge Morales Adriazola owing to his
congressional immunity. The court refused to suspend this immunity
in order to try him. One of the journalists named as receiving some
payments was Carlos Sepulveda, now president of the Professional
College of Chile. About Guillermo Correa Fuenzalida, see "La
historia yanqui de un Presidente chileno", a series published by me
in PURO CHILE, Feb. 17-28, 1973.
 
[5] The story of the $20 million fund for Frei's 1964 presidential
campaign was published in the April 6, 1973, issue of the
Washington Post. The newspaper quotes a witness as saying, "U.S.
government intervention in Chile in 1964 was blatant and almost
obscene". The Post also reported that "the number of 'special
personnel' dispatched at various stages of the campaign to Chile
from Washington and other posts was calculated by one key Latin
American policy maker at the time as being in the range of 100".
The leftist political parties PS and MAPU afterward put together
"La historia yanqui de un President chileno" in PURO CHILE
(op.cit.), revealing the relations between Frei and the American
consortia; other reports appeared in CAUSA ML, No. 5, 1969, and in
the June 8, 1973, issue of PUNTO FINAL, "Acta de acusacion contra
Eduardo Frei", to bring about action against Frei in the Chilean
Congress for providing services to a foreign power during the term
of his presidency. The accusation was of course rejected by the
reactionary majority in the Senate, but the charges were so well
documented that Frei could not enjoin their publication. The
denunciations included copies of letters to Frei from David
Rockefeller and his "economic instructions" (published earlier in
MAYORIA, Jan. 1972).
Here are some paragraphs from the texts published in MAYORIA:
"Meeting of November 12, 1963, between Robert Haldeman, vice-
president of Braden [the Kennecott mine, El Teniente] and Frei at
the home of Jose Claro Vial [Gabriel Gonzalez Videla's son-in-law],
at the request of Frei. Frei said: 'I am certain that if elected
President, we will not have problems in reducing the present high
taxes, either by agreement, law, or legal contract...Here in Chile
I feel closer to Braden than to the Anaconda people...Mr. Milliken
[of Kennecott] is a hard and dry man. I do not doubt his
intelligence, but he does not have the human warmth and cordiality
that Mr. Roy Glover [world chief of Anaconda] had; I had
established a very good friendship with him and he was always
grateful to me for voting in favour of the Nuevo Trato law [a 1958
law that scandalized Chile because of its guarantees to the
American copper companies]".[Text found in the El Teniente offices
in Santiago after the nationalization, a memorandum of Manuel
Illanes, a Chilean journalist and a Kennecott official.)
Another quote: "In August 1968, HANSON'S LATIN AMERICAN NEWSLETTER,
published in the United States, said in a study of the Frei
administration: "No other government of the extreme right has been
so generous with the American companies as the Frei administration,
through the agreement he has signed. His exceedingly favourable
treatment lacked balance and judgement and was so harmful to
Chilean interests that it provoked hilarity in Washington".
(HANSON'S LATIN AMERICAN NEWSLETTER, mimeographed issues published
by a private company in Washington, D.C., regularly sent to Chilean
periodicals in 1967-1969).

[6] The relation between Plan Camelot (for details see Gregorio
Selser's "Espionaje en America Latina", Buenos Aires, 1966) and Roy
Hansen's study was inferred in the sessions of the Chilean Chamber
of Deputies from June to December 1965, which convened as a result
of the revelations about that espionage project published in the
newspaper EL SIGLO in May, June and July 1965, and by myself and
Miroslav Popic on Radio Portales in Santiago on the Sunday new
program "La Gran Encuesta" in June and July of the same year. As
shown by the statements of Juan de Dios Carmona, Frei's Defense
Minister at the time of the scandal, to the Chamber of Deputies'
Investigatory Commission, the Defense Ministry had known about
Hansen's study and had authorized it because it "was not considered
to be espionage". Hansen himself wrote that "the data was collected
during a series of three trips (15 weeks in total) to Chile between
1964 and 1965. Two hundred Chilean civilians were interviewed;
there were intensive interviews with 38 generals, and a
questionnaire was distributed among active officers of the Academy
of War and the Polytechnic School". He adds that his trips took
place between December 1964 and June 1965, and that he had access
to the documents in the Chilean Army General Staff library (off
limits to Chilean civilians). The introduction of Plan Camelot in
Chile was under the charge of Hugo Nuttini, a sociologist who
contacted Alvaro and Ximena Bunster to begin a team operation.
The Scandinavian sociologist Johan Galtung alerted leftist
journalists, and the scandal about Plan Camelot began in May 1965.
For details on these events, see my book GOLPE DE ESTADO CONTRA
FREI?, Ediciones Punto Final, Santiago, 1965. Transcripts of my
radio program "La Gran Encuesta" were in the files of the
Information and Broadcast of the presidency in Santiago until
September 11, 1973. On the involvement of American University with
Project Camelot, see THE RISE AND FALL OF PROJECT CAMELOT: STUDIES
IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PRACTICAL POLITICS,
edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, revised
edition, 1974, especially pages 23-25. On Roy Hansen see, also, THE
BLACK BOOK OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION, by Armando Uribe, Boston,
Beacon Press, 1975, pages 26-29.

[7] In 1969 some Chilean journalists gained access to the
"classified" copy that existed in Chile, and a summary of its
contents was published in the Santiago magazine CAUSA ML, No. 21,
Aug. 1971, pp. 20-25 (Robinson Rojas was the director of the
magazine). Hansen's work was funded by the Ford Foundation and
the Rand Corporation.  
[8] The quotes from the text of Plan Camelot come from the Spanish 
edition published in August 1965 by the Oficina de
Informaciones de la Camara de Senadores de Chile as a document
appended to the that the Chamber of Deputies was conducting into
the alleged "espionage". The introduction to Plan Camelot stated
that its purpose was to find a "system" which would "make it
possible to predict and politically influence significant aspects
of social change in the world's developing countries" (p. 2 of
Spanish edition). In late June 1965, UPI released a bulletin from
Washington reporting the "suspension" of Plan Camelot:
    "Responsibility for the operation belonged to the Special 
Operations Research Office (SORO) of the American University in  
Washington, DC". A Pentagon spokesman stated on July 8 of that year
that the project, launched by the Army's information services, was 
functioning in various countries: Peru, Colombia and Chile; that
it had already cost some $300,000, and that already "a great number
of specialists in social sciences of international reputation had
contributed ideas and information referring to Communist subversive
attacks." On July 21, when a group of sociologists at the
University of Chile denounced the attitude of Hugo Nuttini, the
total funds invested in the project to that time amounted to
some $6 million (see Alain Labrousse, "El experimento chileno",
Ediciones Grijalbo, 1973, p. 150)
The quotes from the sociologist Roy Hansen's work came from a
photographic copy of the mimeographed English version that is
kept in the Academy of War's library in Santiago. After Sept. 11,
1973, I destroyed the negatives of that photographic copy, while
the positive copy in my office at the journal PURO CHILE was
probably burned when the military bombed and set fire to our
building on the day of the coup. In my article "Las Fuerzas 
Armadas Chilenas (Causa ML, No. 21, Aug.1971, pp. 11-25), I
published an extensive extract from Hansen's investigations.

[9] In Causa ML, No. 2, August 1968, in my article "La Penetracion
Norteamericana en las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas", the first
documented denunciations were made of the introduction of anti-
Marxist courses in the Bernardo O'Higgins Military School. More
were made in 'Punto Final' in 1969 and 1970. The expression
"Western and Christian" had been in use since the violent
presidential campaign of 1964 as an answer to the "Oriental,
atheist world" in defining the struggle of capitalism against
Communism. From that time on, "Western and Christian" had come to
mean the "non-Socialist" world and had lost the religious
connotation of "Christian". Speeches, books, college theses, and
the armed forces were using this expression in that sense.
The beginning of the military school's upper classmen going to the
Canal Zone in 1968 was made public in an allusive speech by Rene
Schneider, who by that time was director of the military school.
For the general anti-Communist orientation in Chilean Military
education, see Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Alberto Polloni, 'Las
Fuerzas Armadas de Chile en la vida nacional", Editorial Juridica
de Chile, Santiago, 1972.

[10] The quotes from 'The Rockefeller Report on the Americas' come
from a Spanish translation made by the Oficina de Informaciones de
la Camara del Senado de Chile in December 1969.
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