TRANSCRIPT Public
Testimony Before 9/11 Panel
pp. 42-83
by The
New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 23 - Following is the the transcript of public testimony from
four high-ranking officials from the Bush and Clinton administrations before the
independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks, as recorded by Federal News
Service.
ON THE COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
MARCH 23, 2004
SPEAKERS:
THOMAS H. KEAN, COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
LEE H. HAMILTON, COMMISSION VICE CHAIR
RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, COMMISSION MEMBER
MAX CLELAND, COMMISSION MEMBER
FRED F. FIELDING, COMMISSION MEMBER
JAMIE S. GORELICK, COMMISSION MEMBER
SLADE GORTON, COMMISSION MEMBER
JOHN F. LEHMAN, COMMISSION MEMBER
TIMOTHY J. ROEMER, COMMISSION MEMBER
JAMES R. THOMPSON, COMMISSION MEMBER
PHILIP ZELIKOW, COMMISSION EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR MICHAEL HURLEY, COMMISSION SENIOR COUNSEL
WITNESSES:
MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, FORMER U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE
COLIN POWELL, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE
RICHARD ARMITAGE, U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WILLIAM COHEN, FORMER U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DONALD RUMSFELD, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
PAUL WOLFOWITZ, U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
GENERAL RICHARD MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
(Page 42 of 83)
ZELIKOW: The president approved their recommendation on that target while choosing not
to proceed with the strike on the other target in Sudan, a business believed to be owned
by bin Laden. DCI Tenet and National Security Advisor Berger told us that. Based on what
they know today, they still believe they made the right recommendation and that the
president made the right decision. We have encountered no dissenters among his top
advisers. This strike was launched on August 20th. The missiles hit their intended
targets, but neither bin Laden or any other terrorist leaders were killed. The decision to
destroy the plant in Sudan became controversial. Some at the time argued that the
decisions were influenced by domestic political considerations, given the controversies
raging at that time. The staff has found no evidence that domestic political
considerations entered into the discussion or the decision-making process. All evidence we
have found points to national security considerations as the sole basis for President
Clinton's decision. The impact of the criticism lingered, however, as policy-makers looked
to proposals for new strikes. The controversy over the Sudan attack in particular shadowed
future discussions about the quality of intelligence that would be needed about other
targets -- Operation Infinite Resolve and Plan Delenda (ph). Senior officials agree that a
principal objective of Operation Infinite Reach was to kill Osama bin Laden and that this
objective obviously had not been attained. The initial strikes went beyond targeting bin
Laden to damage other camps thought to be supporting his organizations. These strikes were
not envisioned as the end of the story. On August 20th, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Shelton, issued a planning order for the preparation of follow-on
strikes. This plan was later code-named Operation Infinite Resolve. The day after the
strikes, the president and his principle advisers apparently began considering follow-on
military planning. A few days later, the NSC staff's national coordinator for
counterterrorism, Richard Clarke, informed other senior officials that President Clinton
was inclined to launch further strikes sooner rather than later.
On August 27th, Undersecretary of Defense Slocombe advised Secretary William Cohen that
the available targets were not promising. There was, he said, also an issue of strategy,
the need to think of the effort as a long-term campaign. The experience of last week he
wrote, quote, Has only confirmed the importance of defining a clearly articulated
rationale for military action, close quote, that was effective as well as justified.
ZELIKOW: Active consideration of follow-on strikes continued into September. In this
context, Clarke prepared a paper for a political-military plan he called Delenda (ph) from
the Latin, to destroy. Its military component envisioned an ongoing campaign of regular
small strikes occurring from time to time whenever target information was right in order
to underscore the message of a concerted, systematic and determined effort to dismantle
the infrastructure of the bin Laden terrorist network. Clarke recognized that individual
targets might not have much value, but he wrote to Berger, We will never again be able to
target a leadership conference of terrorists, and that should not be the standard.
Principals repeatedly considered Clarke's proposed strategy. But none of them agreed with
it. Secretary Cohen told us that the camps were primitive, easily constructed facilities
with rope ladders. The question was whether it was worth using very expensive missiles to
take out what General Shelton called jungle-gym training camps. That would not have been
seen as very effective. National Security Adviser Berger and others told us that more
strikes, if they failed to kill bin Laden could actually be counterproductive, increasing
bin Laden's stature. These issues need to be viewed, they said, in a wider context. The
United States launched air attacks against Iraq at the end of 1998 and against Serbia in
1999, all to widespread criticism around the world. About a later proposal for strikes on
targets in Afghanistan, Deputy National Security Adviser James Steinberg noted that it
offered, quote little benefit, lots of blowback against bomb-happy United States, close
quote. In September of 1998, while the follow-on strikes were still being debated among a
small group of top advisers, the counterterrorism officials in the office of the secretary
of defense were also considering a strategy. Unaware of Clarke's plan, they developed an
elaborate proposal for a quote, more aggressive counterterrorism posture, close quote. The
paper urged defense to, quote, champion a national effort to take up the gauntlet that
international terrorists have thrown at our feet, close quote. Although the terrorist
threat had grown, the authors warn that quote, We have not fundamentally altered our
philosophy or our approach, close quote. If there were new horrific attacks, they wrote,
that then, quote, We will have no choice, nor unfortunately will we have a plan, close
quote. They outlined an eight-part strategy to be more proactive and aggressive. The
assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, Alan
Holmes, brought the paper to Undersecretary Slocombe's chief deputy, Jan Lodel (ph). The
paper did not go further. Its lead author recalls being told by Holmes that Lodel (ph)
thought it was too aggressive. Holmes cannot recall what was said, and Lodel (ph) cannot
remember the episode or the paper at all. The president and his advisers remain ready to
use military action against the terrorist threat. But the urgent interest in launching
follow-on strikes had apparently passed by October.
(Page 43 of 83)
ZELIKOW: The focus shifted to an effort to find strikes that would clearly be
effective, to find and target bin Laden himself. Military planning continues. Though plans
were not executed, the military continued to assess and update target lists regularly in
case the military was asked to strike. Plans largely centered on cruise missile and manned
aircraft strike options and were updated and refined continuously through March 2001.
Several senior Clinton administration officials, including National Security Adviser
Berger and the NSC staff's Clarke, told us the President Clinton was interested in
additional military options, including the possible use of ground forces. As part of
Operation Infinite Resolve, the military produced those options. We'll skip the next
paragraph that details them and go to the relationship of the White House and the
Pentagon, which was complex. As Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold, director of operations
for the Joint Staff put it, The military was often frustrated by civilian policy-makers
whose requests for military options were too simplistic. For their part, White House
officials were often frustrated by what they saw as military unwillingness to tackle the
counterterrorism problem. Skipping the next paragraph, go to General Shelton said that,
quote, Given sufficient actionable intelligence, the military can do the operation, close
quote. But he explained that a tactical operation, if it did not go well, could turn out
to be an international embarrassment for the United States. Shelton and many other
military officers and civilian DOD officials we interviewed recalled their memories of
episodes such as the failed hostage rescue in Iran in 1980 and the Black Hawk Down events
in Somalia in 1993. General Shelton made clear, however, that upon direction from
policymakers, the military would proceed with an operation and carry out the order.
Skipping the next paragraph, let's go to the concerns expressed by the commander in chief
of the U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM, General Anthony Zinni.
Before 9/11, any military action in Afghanistan would be carried out by CENTCOM. The
Special Operations Command did not have the lead. It provided forces that could be used in
a CENTCOM-led operation. The views of the key field commander, Cary Greg White (ph):
General Zinni told us he did not believe that some of the options his command was ordered
to develop would be effective, particularly missile strikes. Zinni thought a better
approach would have been a broad strategy to build up local counterterrorism capabilities
in neighboring countries, using military assistance to help country like Uzbekistan. This
strategy, he told us, was impeded by a lack of funds and limited interest in countries
like Uzbekistan that had dictatorial governments. Skipping the next paragraph, let's
emphasize that military officers explained to us that sending Special Operations Forces
into Afghanistan would have been complicated and risky.
ZELIKOW: Such efforts would have required bases in the region, however. The basing
options in the region were unappealing. Pro- Taliban elements of Pakistan's military might
warn bin Laden or his associates of pending operations. The rest of the paragraph gives an
example of that, but go to the next one: With nearby basing options limited, an
alternative was to fly from ships in the Arabian sea, or from land bases in the Persian
Gulf, as was later done after 9/11. Such operations would then have to be supported from
long distances, over-flying the airspace of nations that might not be supportive or aware
of the U.S. efforts. Finally, Military leaders again raise the problem of actionable
intelligence, warning that they did not have information about where bin Laden would be by
the time forces would be able to strike him. If they were in the region for a long period,
perhaps clandestinely, the military might attempt to gather intelligence and wait for an
opportunity. One special operations commander said his view of actionable intelligence was
that if you give us the action, we'll give you the intelligence. But this course would be
risky, both in light of the difficulties already mentioned, and the danger that U.S.
operations might fail disastrously, as in the 1980 Iran rescue failure. Cruise missiles as
the default option. Cruise missiles became the default option because it was the only
option left on the table after the rejection of others. The Tomahawk's long range,
lethality and extreme accuracy made it the missile of choice. However, as a means to
attack Al Qaida and OBL-linked targets pre-9/11, cruise missiles were problematic.
Tomahawk cruise missiles had to be launched after the vessels carrying them moved into
position. Once these vessels were in position, there was still an interval as decision
makers authorized the strike, the missiles were prepared for firing, and they flew to
their targets. Officials worried that bin Laden might move during these hours, from the
place of his last sighting, even if that information had been current. Moreover, General
Zinni told commission staff that he had been deeply concerned that cruise missile strikes
inside Afghanistan would kill numerous civilians. The rest of the paragraph offers detail
on that, but let's go to the next section -- no actionable intelligence.
The paramount limitations cited by senior officials on every proposed use of military
force was the lack of actionable intelligence.
(Page 44 of 83)
ZELIKOW: By this, they meant precise intelligence on where bin Laden would be and how
long he would be there. National Security Adviser Berger said that there was never a
circumstance where the policy-makers thought they had good intelligence, but declined to
launch a missile at OBL-linked targets for fear of possible collateral damage. He told us
the deciding factor was whether there was actionable intelligence. If the shot missed bin
Laden, the United States would look weak and bin Laden would look strong. There were
frequent reports about bin Laden's whereabouts and activities. The daily reports regularly
described where he was, what he was doing and where he might be going. But usually, by the
time these descriptions were landing on the desks of DCI Tenet or National Security
Adviser Berger, bin Laden had already moved. Nevertheless, on occasion, intelligence was
deemed credible enough to warrant planning for possible strikes to kill Osama bin Laden.
Kandahar, December 1998 -- the first instance was in December 1998 in Kandahar. There was
intelligence that bin Laden was staying at a particular location. Strikes were readied
against this and plausible alternative locations. The principal advisers to the president
agreed not to recommend a strike. Returning from one of their meetings, DCI Tenet told
staff that the military, supported by everyone else in the room, had not wanted to launch
a strike because no one had seen Osama bin Laden in a couple of hours. DCI Tenet told us
that there were concerns about the veracity of the source and about the risk of collateral
damage to a nearby mosque. A few weeks later, to set the time, Clarke described the
calculus as one that had weighed 50 percent confidence in the intelligence against
collateral damage estimated at perhaps 300 casualties. After this episode, Pentagon
planners intensified efforts to find a more precise alternative to cruise missiles, such
as using precision-strike aircraft. This option would greatly reduce the collateral
damage. Yet not only would it have to operate at long ranges from home bases and overcome
significant logistical obstacles, but the aircraft might also be shot down by the Taliban.
At the time, Clarke complained that General Zinni was opposed to the forward deployment
of these aircraft. General Zinni does not recall blocking such an option. The aircraft
apparently were not deployed for this purpose. The desert camp, February 1999 -- during
the winter of 1998 and '99, intelligence reported that bin Laden frequently visited a camp
in the desert adjacent to a larger hunting camp in Helmand Province of Afghanistan used by
visitors from a Gulf state. Public sources have stated that these visitors were from the
United Arab Emirates. At the beginning of February, bin Laden was reportedly located there
and apparently remained for more than a week. This was not in an urban area so the risk of
collateral damage was minimal. Intelligence provided a detailed description of the camps.
National technical intelligence confirmed the description of the larger camp and showed
the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the UAE. The CIA received reports that bin
Laden regularly went from his adjacent camp to the larger camp, where he visited with
emirates. The location of this larger camp was confirmed by February 9th, but the location
of bin Laden's quarters could not be pinned down so precisely. Preparations were made for
a possible strike, at least against the larger camp, perhaps to target bin Laden during
one of his visits. No strike was launched. According to CIA officials, policy-makers were
concerned about the danger that a strike might kill an emirate prince or other senior
officials who might be with bin Laden or close by.
ZELIKOW: The lead CIA official in the field felt the intelligence reporting in this
case was very reliable. The OBL unit chief at the time agrees. The field official believes
today that this was a lost opportunity to kill bin Laden before 9/11. Clarke told us the
strike was called off because the intelligence was dubious and it seemed to him as if the
CIA was presenting an option to attack America's best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf.
Documentary evidence at the time shows that on February 10th, Clarke detailed to Deputy
National Security Adviser Donald Kerrick the intelligence placing OBL in the camp,
informed him that DOD might be in the position to fire the next morning and added General
Shelton was looking at other options that might ready the following week. Clarke had just
returned from a visit to the UAE working on counterterrorism cooperation and following up
on a May 1998 UAE agreement to buy F-16 aircraft from the United States. On February 10th,
Clarke reported that a top UAE official had vehemently denied that high-level UAE
officials were in Afghanistan. Evidence subsequently confirmed that high-level UAE
officials had been hunting there. By February 12th, bin Laden had apparently moved on and
the immediate strike plans became moot. In March, the entire camp complex was hurriedly
disassembled. We are still examining several aspect of this episode. Kandahar, May 1999 --
in this case, sources reported on the whereabouts of bin Laden over the course of five
nights. The reporting was very detailed. At the time, CIA working level officials were
told that strikes were not ordered because the military was concerned about the precision
of the sources's reporting and the risk of collateral damage. Replying to a frustrated
colleague in the field, the OBL unit chief wrote that, quote, Having a chance to get OBL
three times in 36 hours and forgoing the chance each time has made me a bit angry. The DCI
finds himself alone at the table with the other principals basically saying, We'll go
along with your decision, Mr. Director, and implicitly saying, the agency will hang alone
if the attack doesn't get bin Laden, close quote. These are working level perspectives.
(Page 45 of 83)
According to DCI Tenet, the same circumstances prevented a strike in each of the cases
described above. The intelligence was based on a single uncorroborated source and there
was a risk of collateral damage. In the first and third cases, the cruise missile option
was rejected outright and, in the case of the second, never came to a clear decision
point. According to National Security Adviser Berger, the cases were really DCI Tenet's
call, close quote. In his view, in none of the cases did policy-makers have the reliable
intelligence that was needed.
ZELIKOW: In Berger's opinion, this did not reflect risk aversion or a lack of desire to
act on DCI Tenet's part. The DCI was just as stoked up as he was, said Berger. Each of
these times, Berger told us, George would call and say, We just don't have it. There was a
fourth episode involving a location in Ghazni, Afghanistan in July, 1999. We are still
investigating the circumstances. There were no occasions after July, 1999, when cruise
missiles were actively readied for a possible strike against bin Laden. The challenge of
providing actionable intelligence could not be overcome before 9/11. Skip the next section
on millennium plots. Go directly to the section on the attack on the USS Cole. On October
12, 2000, suicide bombers in an explosives-laden skiff rammed into a Navy destroyer, the
USS Cole, in the port of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 U.S. sailors and almost sinking the
vessel. Skip the remainder of the paragraph. After the attack on the USS Cole, National
Security Advisor Berger asked General Shelton for military plans to act quickly against
bin Laden. General Shelton tasked General Tommy Franks, the new commander of CENTCOM, to
look again at the options. According to Director of Operations Newgold, Shelton wanted to
demonstrate that the military was imaginative and knowledgeable enough to move on an array
of options and to show the complexity of the operations. Shelton briefed Berger on 13
options that had been developed within the standing Infinite Resolve plan. CENTCOM also
developed a, quote, Phase campaign concept, close quote, for wider ranging strikes
including against the Taliban and without a fixed end point. The new concept did not
include contingency plans for an invasion of Afghanistan. The concept was briefed to
Deputy National Security Advisor Kerrick and other officials in December, 2000. Neither
the Clinton administration nor the Bush administration launched a military response for
the Cole attack. Berger and other senior policy-makers said that, while most
counterterrorism officials quickly pointed the finger at Al Qaida, they never received the
sort of definitive judgment from the CIA or the FBI that Al Qaida was responsible that
they would need before launching military operations. Documents show that in late 2000,
the president's advisers received a cautious presentation of the evidence, showing that
individuals linked to Al Qaida had carried out or supported the attack, but that the
evidence could not establish that bin Laden himself had ordered the attack. DOD prepared
plans to strike Al Qaida camps and Taliban targets with cruise missiles in case
policy-makers decided to respond. Essentially the same analysis of Al Qaida's
responsibility for the attack on the USS Cole was delivered to the highest officials of
the new administration 5 days after it took office. The same day, Clarke advised National
Security Advisor Rice that the government, quote, Should take advantage of the policy that
we will respond at a time, place and manner of our own choosing and not be forced into
knee-jerk responses, close quote. Deputy National Security Advisor Steven Hadley told us
that tit for that, military options were so inadequate that they might have emboldened Al
Qaida. He said the Bush administration's response to the Cole would be a new, more
aggressive strategy against Al Qaida. Pentagon officials, including Vice Admiral Scott Fry
and Undersecretary Slocombe, told us they cautioned that the military response options
were limited. Bin Laden continued to be elusive. They were still skeptical that hitting
inexpensive and rudimentary training camps with costly missiles would do much good. The
new team at the Pentagon did not push for a response for the Cole, according to Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, his deputy. Wolfowitz told us that by the time the
new administration was in place the Cole incident was stale. The 1998 cruise missile
strike showed OBL and Al Qaida that they had nothing to fear from a U.S. response,
Wolfowitz said. For his part, Rumsfeld also thought too much time had passed. He worked on
the force protection recommendations developed in the aftermath of the USS Cole attack,
not response options.
(Page 46 of 83)
ZELIKOW: The early months of the Bush administration: The confirmation of the
Pentagon's new leadership was a lengthy process. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz was
not confirmed until March 2001, and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith did
not take office until July 2001. Secretary Cohen said he briefed Secretary-Designate
Rumsfeld on about 50 items during the transition, including bin Laden and programs related
to domestic preparedness against terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction.
Rumsfeld told us he did not recall what was said about bin Laden at that briefing. On
February 8th, General Shelton briefed Secretary Rumsfeld on the Operation Infinite Resolve
plan, including the range of options and CENTCOM's new phased campaign plan. These plans
were periodically updated during the ensuing months. Brian Sheridan, the outgoing
assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict, SOLIC,
the key counterterrorism policy office in DOD, never briefed Rumsfeld. Lower level SOLIC
officials in the office of the secretary of defense told us that they thought the new team
was focused on other issues and was not especially interested in their counterterrorism
agenda. Undersecretary Feith told the commission that when he arrived at the Pentagon in
July 2001, Rumsfeld asked him to focus his attention on working with the Russians on
agreements to dissolve the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty and preparing a new nuclear arms
control pact. Traditionally, the primary DOD official responsible for counterterrorism
policy had been the assistant secretary of defense for SOLIC. The outgoing assistant
secretary left on January 20th, 2001, and had not been replaced when the Pentagon was hit
on September 11th. Secretary Rumsfeld said the transformation was the focus on the
administration. He said he was interested in terrorism, arranging to meet regularly with
DCI Tenet. But his time was consumed with getting new officials in place, preparing the
quadrennial defense review, the defense planning guidance, and reviewing existing
contingency plans. He did not recall any particular counterterrorism issue that engaged
his attention before 9/11, other than the development of the Predator unmanned aircraft
system for possible use against bin Laden.
He said that DOD before 9/11 was not organized or trained adequately to deal with
asymmetric threats. As recounted in the previous staff statement, the Bush
administration's NSC staff was drafting a new counterterrorism strategy in the spring and
summer of 2001. National Security Adviser Rice and Deputy National Security Adviser Hadley
told us that they wanted more muscular options. In June 2001, Hadley circulated a draft
presidential directive on policy toward Al Qaida. The draft came to include a section that
called for development of a new set of contingency military plans against both Al Qaida
and the Taliban regime. Hadley told us that he contacted Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to
advise him that the Pentagon would soon need to start preparing fresh plans in response to
this forthcoming presidential direction. The directive was approved at the deputies' level
in July and apparently approved by top officials on September 4 for submission to the
president. With the directive still awaiting the president's signature, Secretary Rumsfeld
did not order the preparation of any new military plans against either Al Qaida or the
Taliban before 9/11. Rumsfeld told us that immediately after 9/11 he did not see a
contingency plan he wanted to implement. Deputy National Security Adviser Hadley and
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz also told us the military plans presented to the Bush
administration immediately after 9/11 were unsatisfactory.
ZELIKOW: Roads not taken -- officials we interviewed flatly said that neither Congress
nor the American public would have supported large scale military operations in
Afghanistan before the shock of 9/11, despite repeated attacks and plots including the
embassy bombings, the millennium plots, concerns about Al Qaida to acquire WMD, the USS
Cole and the summer 2001 threat spike. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz warned that it would
have been impossible to get Congress to support sending 10,000 U.S. troops into
Afghanistan to do what the Soviet Union failed to do in the 1980s. Vice Admiral Scott Fry,
the former operations director for the JCS noted that, quote, A two or four-division plan
would require a footprint troop level and force that was larger than the political
leadership was willing to accept, close quote. Special Operations Forces always saw
counterterrorism as part of their mission and trained for counterterrorist operations.
Quote, The opportunities were missed because of an unwillingness to take risks and a lack
of vision and understanding of the benefits when preparing the battlespace ahead of time,
close quote, said Lieutenant General William Boykin, the current undersecretary of defense
for intelligence and a former founding member of Delta Force. Before 9/11 the U.S. special
operations command was a, quote, supporting command, not a supported command. That meant
it supported General Zinni and CENTCOM and did not independently prepare plans itself.
General Pete Schoomaker, the chief of staff of the U.S. Army and former commander of the
U.S. Special Operations Command said that if the special operations command had been a
supported command before 9/11, he would have had the Al Qaida mission rather than
deferring to CENTCOM's lead. Schoomaker said he spoke to Secretary Cohen and General
Shelton about this proposal. It was not adopted. Let me move now directly to our
conclusions and finish. In summary, our key findings to date include the following: In
response to the request of policymakers, the military prepared a wide array of options for
striking bin Laden and his organization from May 1998 onward. When they briefed
policy-makers, the military presented both the pros and cons of those strike options and
briefed policy-makers on the risks associated with them. Following the August 20th, 1998
missile strikes, both senior military officials and policy-makers placed great emphasis on
actionable intelligence as the key factor in recommending or deciding to launch military
action against bin Laden and his organization. Policy-makers and military officials
expressed frustration with the lack of actionable intelligence. Some officials inside the
Pentagon, including those in the special forces and the counterterrorism policy office
expressed frustration with the lack of military action. The new administration began to
develop new policies toward Al Qaida in 2001, but there is no evidence of new work on
military capabilities or plans against this enemy before September 11th. And both civilian
and military officials of the defense department state flatly that neither Congress nor
the American public would have supported large-scale military operations in Afghanistan
before the shock of 9/11. Thank you. Thank you all very much.
(Page 47 of 83)
KEAN: We'll now hear from former Secretary of Defense William Cohen. Secretary Cohen
served with great distinction in the United States Senate before serving as secretary of
defense during the second term of President Clinton. Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased
that you've consented to be with us today. And we'd like you, if you could, to raise your
hand so we can place you under oath. Do you swear or affirm to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth?
COHEN: Thank you very much. Your prepared statement will be entered into the record in
full. And so we'd ask you to summarize your remarks as you'd like.
COHEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I'd like I'd like to express my gratitude
to the commission for the important work that you are undertaking. I've had the
opportunity, I think, to meet with either the members and/or staff on three prior
occasions. And I am happy to be here today to contribute whatever I can to the important
analysis that you are undertaking. September 11th was a life-transforming event I think
for all of us. It was a barbaric attack, killing some 3,000 Americans by turning airliners
into cruise missiles. I think all of us have a solemn responsibility to the victims of
September 11th, to the victims' families, many of whom may be here today and certainly are
watching, and also to the brave men and
COHEN: Let me say on a personal note, my interest in the subject of terrorism began
about a quarter of a century ago. I had attended an event -- conference in Bonn, Germany.
A banker by the name of Hans-Martin Schleyer (ph), a businessman, had been assassinated by
the Red Army faction, and the Europeans were eager to explore ways in which they could
combat the scourge of international terrorism. During the time I served as a member of the
United States Senate and the Armed Services Committee, I saw the bombing of our embassy in
Beirut, the bombing of our Marine barracks in Beirut, the bombing of Pan Am 103, the
hijacking of TWA-847, the bombing of the West Berlin discotheque, the bombing of OPM-SANG
and of Khobar Towers, among the many acts that were directed against the United States. As
a result, during that time, I became convinced that our military was not organized to act
swiftly enough in the age of what Toffler described as that of future shock. I helped to
write the Goldwater-Nichols Act, establishing the power and the leadership of the joint
chiefs of staff as a result of being concerned about what's taken place. That came, by the
way, over the objection of the Pentagon during that time. In 1986, I authored the
legislation to establish a Special Operation Command, once again, I would point out, over
the objections of the Pentagon, because I felt it was important to enable us to be able to
respond to the emerging threats. I wrote and I spoke about the subject on numerous
occasions convinced that the threat was growing, was becoming more organized, less
sporadic, and when coupled with access of weapons of mass destruction, likely to pose an
existential threat to the world. I carried these convictions to the Pentagon when
President Clinton asked me to serve as the secretary of defense. I found that he not only
shared my views, but he was prepared to support efforts to counter these threats with
dollars, with deeds, as well as with his presidential words. In my experience, the threat
of international terrorism remained a top priority for all members of his national
security team throughout the years I served at the Pentagon.
COHEN: In my written statement, I outlined some of the major initiatives that I had the
department undertake between January of '97 and 2001. They included enhancing force
protection; support for covert and special operations activity; designating and organizing
a National Guard to serve as the first responders in the wake of attacks against our
cities; organizing a joint task force for civil support to assist the cities and states
against terrorist attacks that might take place; helping to train 100 major cities in
consequence management against terrorist attacks; engaging in personal diplomacy and
public appearances to alert the American people to the threat posed by anthrax, ricin, VX
and radiological materials, the danger of them falling into the hands of terrorist groups.
These initiatives were undertaken as the department was engaged in waging war in Kosovo;
we attacked Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Fox; as we destroyed a suspected WMD site
in Sudan; as we coped with the dangers of cyber attacks against our critical
infrastructure, including the unknown consequences of a critical massive cyber failure
that was then known as Y2K. I believe that we devoted some $3 billion to $4 billion in
defense spending at that time to cope with that for fear that the terrorists would try to
exploit that millennium turnover. We launched an attack upon Al Qaida's training camp in
Afghanistan as has been discussed earlier today. We continued efforts to capture or kill
Osama bin Laden after discovering his role in the bombing of the embassies in Africa and
then later with the USS Cole. And we developed new intelligence-gathering capabilities
that could be directed against Osama bin Laden and others as, again, you have discussed
here earlier this morning. In addition, the department also worked closely with the CIA,
the FBI and other agencies, and as a result, I believe we were able to thwart a number of
terrorist activities directed here against Americans and abroad. I know the commission is
anxious to explore more specifically what happened or did not happen at the Defense
Department. But I'd like to try and paint in the few moments I have at least a broader
perspective as well. I think all of us who have held the public trust have to be
accountable for what we did or did not do during our careers in the public service and
holding the public trust. (APPLAUSE) But I want to put it into perspective as a former
member of the Senate and a former member of the House of Representatives as well, because
I think as the commission may find fault, indeed that's all -- in all probability, that
might be the goal of the commission. I don't think so. But I hope you'll find the fault
lines as well in our society as a whole. And if you just permit me four or five minutes to
outline some of the challenges I think that all of us face, certainly while I was in the
Senate, also at the Department of Defense, I'd point out that on many occasions the
administration was able to secure the cooperation of Congress in the pursuit of its goals.
There were a number of other occasions in which we did not.
(Page 48 of 83)
COHEN: For example, some in Congress, the media and the policy community accused those
of us who were focused on the terrorist threat of being alarmists, of exaggerating the
threat in order to boost our budgets. And countering this threat of terrorism was, quote,
the latest gravy train, according to one expert who was quoted in U.S. News World Report.
And the belief that we were somehow indulging in a cynical hyperbole I think resulted in a
number of legislative reactions. There were tens of millions of dollars cut out of the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, in the so-called Nunn-Lugar program, which I believe
was one of the most important programs we could have passed, and that was to help reduce
the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear materials and others in the
possession of the former Soviet Union. Tens of millions of dollars were cut from that
program, I think posing a greater risk to us. We had to spend a significant amount of time
trying to lobby to restore funds in that regard. Congress blocked the cooperation with
countries whose support was critical to the counterterrorism efforts, such as banning
military cooperation with Indonesia, by way of example, the world's largest Muslim country
that is a key battleground in the campaign against Islamic extremists and banning any
meaningful cooperation with Pakistan, the front line state in the global war on terrorism.
There were reasons for this, but nonetheless, that was the reality. We had a program
called IMET which was designed to put our military into contact with the militaries of
other countries to help educate them in the way that a civilized country and democracy is
able to subordinate the military civilian rule and to pursue democratic values. Well, the
program was terminated based on activities that took place in that country and elsewhere.
We had congressional committees who rejected requests for legislative authority to the
department to provide certain support to domestic activity or agencies to prevent or
respond to terrorist actions in the United States. It was with this in mind that I tried
to combat this complacency and cynicism that I helped to create -- not to create, but I
filled the membership of a commission that was led by former Senators Rudman and Hart,
including the vice chairman of this commission and former Speaker Gingrich, along with
senior retired military commanders and others. In releasing the commission's first report
long before September 11, Vice Chairman Hamilton stated the fundamental issue. He said,
What comes across to me in this report more than any other single fact is that the
commission believes that Americans are going to be less secure than they believe
themselves to be, and so I think what we're trying to say in this report is we've lived in
a very secure time, we're very fortunate for that, but we're going to be confronted with a
lot of challenges to our national security that Americans do not believe we're going to be
subject to, and that's really what comes out of this report for me more than any other
single thing. Well, I'll tell you, his remarks really resonated with me, because I recall
at my very first press conference as secretary of defense back in 1997, I was asked, Mr.
Secretary, what is your greatest concern as you look toward the future?
COHEN: And I'd like to just read my response. My greatest concern is that we're able to
persuade the American people that having a viable, sustainable national security policy is
important even when there's no clearly identifiable enemy on the horizon. We still live in
a very dangerous, disorderly world. And in many cases, we face dangers that are comparable
to those we've faced from the past, namely the proliferation of missile technology, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of terrorism. I believe that
we have been complacent as a society. I think that we have failed to fully comprehend the
gathering storm. Even now, after September 11th, I think it's far from clear that our
society truly understands the gravity of a threat that we face or is yet willing to do
what I believe is going to be necessary to counter it. Even after September 11th, after
the anthrax and the ricin attacks in the United States, I remain concerned that the
controversy over not finding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction will lead to the erroneous
assumption that all this talk about the dangers of WMD is just another exercise in the
cynical exploitation of fear. After all, it's commonly noted -- it was noted here again
this morning -- there were no attacks since September 11th. I think this is a dangerous
delusion. The enemy is not only coming, he has been here. He will continue to try to
examine our weaknesses and exploit the crevices in our security and destroy our way of
living as well as our lives. Mr. Chairman, I'll conclude here. I think you can deduce from
my written statement, I believe that the Clinton administration, far more than any
previous administration prior to September 11th, understood the threat that terrorism
poses to our country. I think it took far greater and more comprehensive action to counter
it than previous administration did by virtue of the growing threat. But in spite of all
of this, the United States was hit in a devastating way. Even today, with the global war
on terrorism being waged, I believe we need to do far more to prevent the spread of
virulent Islamic extremism and to prevent terrorism from reaching our shores. I don't
pretend to hold the keys to the kingdom of wisdom and what needs to be done in the future.
But I think, as I said before, we all must stand accountable for our actions. It's my hope
that the commission, again, will focus on the fault lines that run through our democratic
system as we struggle to cope with the challenges of unprecedented proportions. I've
outlined just a couple of items which I think should considered for the future. I think we
have to develop an in-depth public discussion among our citizens, as well as among elected
officials, regarding the compromises on privacy that we're willing to accept in order to
remain free and safe. The current debate over access to personal data for aviation
security purposes, I don't think is encouraging. We have to elevate the public discussion
on these matters and do our best to remove from them electoral manipulation at least until
we truly understand the issues and choices.
(Page 49 of 83)
COHEN: We have to reconcile the role technology's going to play in our lives, for good
and ill, and try to maintain and ensure that it remains our master and that we don't
remain its slave. I don't think it's going to be an easy balance to strike, but I think it
has to be done. I think we have to consider establishing a domestic intelligence
organization distinct from law enforcement and subject to appropriate control and
regulation and oversight. I think we have to secure and eliminate, on an accelerated
basis, fissile nuclear materials and chemical and biological weapon agents that pose a
risk of diversion. This is going to require a much more cooperative relationship with
Russia than we currently have. And I think we have to re-energize America's engagement in
the Middle East. I believe that the road to peace in the Middle East runs through Baghdad.
And success in Baghdad may very well run through Jerusalem. The unabated violence can only
serve, in my judgment, to remain a breeding ground for even more savagery and nihilism in
the future. And this effort should not await the counting of ballots in November. And
finally, I think we need to persuade the free people of the world that the war on terror
cannot be waged by America alone. As recent events demonstrate, religious extremists and
fanatics don't recognize geographic boundaries. There are no rear lines. There are no
pockets of tranquility. There are no safe harbors for innocent civilians. Every one of us
is one the front lines today. A virus or bomb, born in a distant laboratory or a factory,
is but a plane ride away from any place on this planet. So it's time for sober reflection
and the charting of a responsible course of action. And to the extent I can contribute to
this, Mr. Chairman, I'm prepared to answer your questions. KEAN: Mr. Secretary, thank you
very much for a very articulate statement. Commissioner Fielding, are you going to begin
the questioning? And then followed by Commissioner Kerrey.
FIELDING: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for appearing here today, but also thank
you for the many hours you've spent with the commission and the staff in preparing this,
and your very full, prepared testimony as well as your remarks this morning. I'd like to
also express my personal high regard for you and for all the years of public service that
you've given to this nation. Thank you. We, of course, have a mission to fulfill.
FIELDING: And one of the things that we obviously have to figure out is what happened
on 9/11. But equally important to our mission is to figure out the other factors that may
have contributed to the situation we found at 9/11. And obviously, again, one of those is
the development of our counterterrorism strategy. And of course we're going to pick your
brain and again today, as far as the aspects of the military fed into that. And my
colleagues have a lot of questions, so I'll try to watch that little ball as much as
anybody. But under Presidential Directive 62, the military of course and the Defense
Department didn't have the leading role in the counterterrorism efforts during your
tenure. And yet, ironically, we've heard a lot of testimony and a lot of commentary that
the military was being criticized for being reluctant to use its forces and to actually
conduct military operations against Al Qaida and bin Laden. As a matter of fact, Richard
Clarke's now very famous book, he says, The White House wanted action. The senior military
did not, and made it almost impossible for the president to overcome their objections. And
I know that you've seen other commentary like that, that the primary limitation that's
often cited is that for each decision for using military force, there was this lack of
actionable intelligence. And we've heard about it today. And we've heard about it a lot.
And our understanding of that is what was stated earlier, that at a specific time, you
couldn't anticipate where the location of bin Laden or his key followers might be, so that
it could be sufficiently determined that it was worthwhile to launch military reaction to
it. After August 20th of '98, there were at least three opportunities to which we have
been privy to use force against bin Laden. However, in each case, it was determined that
there wasn't actionable intelligence. I guess the first question I'd like to say is whose
call is that? How does that decision become a factor and a determinative factor? And in
addition to that, if I could, given that you had setbacks in using force, what was your
assessment of the existing capabilities at that time of the CIA...
(Page 50 of 83)
COHEN: The which capabilities? KEAN: The existing capabilities -- to obtain what would
be required as actionable intelligence? And to the extent that you found them deficient,
what steps did you take to supplement and to put into action things that the Defense
Department could do to beef up that capability?
COHEN: On the second part, Mr. Fielding, I think that Senator Kerry and others would
tell you that over the years, one of the identifiable deficiencies within our intelligence
collection capability is the absence of good HUMINT, that we have over the years tended to
oscillate between focusing upon technical capabilities with our satellite-gathering
technologies as opposed to developing human intelligence.
COHEN: With the collapse of the Soviet Union, of course, that becomes a much more
challenging objective, to get good human intelligence in areas that are governed by tribal
leaders where an individual perhaps can detect who is a remote cousin the minute they show
up within 200 yards. So penetrating societies such as that becomes even more problematic
in terms of developing good human intelligence. And then you're called upon to try and
develop assets on the ground. Well, then the question is, Who do you trust, and how can
you trust them, based on what evidence in the past that they have been credible? All of
that goes into an analysis by the CIA working with other intelligence agencies. Secretary
Powell talked about I R; we have DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency. But essentially we turn
to the DCI to say, Do we have good intelligence? We review the PDD, as has been discussed
earlier today. We sit down at the Cabinet-level meetings with the president and/or with
the National Security Adviser and his team and say, Is this good enough intelligence to
warrant taking action? And each case has to be looked at in that regard. Now, you
mentioned August of '98. Frankly, it was following the bombing of the embassies in East
Africa that the antenna were really up. We were collecting at a level that I saw -- it was
unprecedented in terms of the amount of information coming in pointing to bin Laden and
then getting the information that would be a gathering of terrorists in Afghanistan. After
reviewing all that information, the determination was made: this was a target certainly
that we should attack -- that plus the so- called pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. But it
was that kind after process whereby -- what do we have? Do we have to be certain? The
answer is no. Do you have to be pretty sure? I think that the answer is yes if you're
going to be killing a lot of people. We're prepared to engage in collateral damage if the
target that we're after is certainly important. But all those factors are into a decision.
But having, quote, actionable intelligence means reliable and the basis of that
reliability. Single-source information, usually I think George Tenet will tell you not
good enough. Maybe if they've got a single source that is truly reliable -- they've had
him in the past -- that might be, under the circumstances. But it all depends upon the
quality of the people you've got on the ground, coupled with whatever you can put up in
the air to locate certain targets. FIELDING: But who makes that final decision? Who makes
that call?
COHEN: The president of the United States makes the final decision. We make
recommendations. We as the national security team would sit down, examine it and then come
to a consensus if we could. If we couldn't, frankly, we would go to the president with our
individual recommendations. But most of the time, we were able to reach a consensus.
COHEN: And then the president weighs what has been recommended to him, to act or not to
act, and then makes the decision.
FIELDING: Just following up, again, on my earlier line of questioning. Did you do
anything or were there any steps available that you thought you were worth taking to
augment the CIA's capabilities for collecting intelligence?
COHEN: We worked with the CIA. There were some joint efforts as such to reinforce the
CIA. We had a cooperative program in terms of the unmanned aerial vehicles, the UAVs.
There was some controversy over that as well, I might add. But trying to find him was
certainly a joint enterprise in terms of technical capability. Did we have people on the
ground in Afghanistan? The answer was we did not, for the most part.
FIELDING: Was that just not really a viable, realistic option?
(Page 51 of 83)
COHEN: Well, again, in looking at Afghanistan, looking at the history of that country,
look at the power and the power and the relationship with the tribes in the region. The
notion that we could put, quote, Special Forces in that region that would go undetected or
uncompromised, I think was pretty remote. Was it possible? You could say it was possible.
Was it advisable? We didn't think so at the time. And I think in reflection, we still
don't think that was a viable option.
FIELDING: I'd like to ask your opinion, because we have to evaluate the various -- the
three incidents. And we've heard a lot of testimony and lot of writings that that
particular second event that I made reference to -- I think it was in February of '99, the
hunting camp with the UAE hunting camp -- that that was the lost opportunity.
COHEN: As I recall, there were at least three instances in which the initial
intelligence take, as they called it, that we think we have him, and what we would then do
is, quote, spin up the military at that point, namely, our ability to target that
particular area with the thought of taking that individual or group of people out. There
were three instances. Each time the munitions and the people were spun up, they were
called off because the word came back: We're not sure -- we're not quite sure. In one
instance, there was an identification that somehow we had bin Laden in our sights. Turned
out it was a sheik from UAE. There was another consideration of shooting down an aircraft
that might be carrying bin Laden, should he try to escape. That also proved to be reversed
by the intelligence community saying we don't think we have him. So there were three
occasions following the attack on the camps in Sudan. But in each and every one of those
occasions, it came back on a second look saying we don't think we've got enough here to
recommend to the president that we should take military action. And that came from the
intelligence community, through the national security adviser, and we all sat and made a
collective judgment: OK, under the circumstances, we don't fire.
FIELDING: Now, if you could assist us, if I can take you back to the August 20th attack
and response attack. After that happened, there was criticism about the pharmaceutical
plant. And there was also criticism in general about trigger-happy and this sort of thing.
And recalling that negative reaction, does that criticism affect the planning and use of
military force in defending the United States in this context?
COHEN: I'm glad you asked that question, Mr. Fielding, because it's something that I've
wanted to talk about for some time. In terms of the kind of poisonous atmosphere that
existed then that continues to exist today, you're going to discuss Mr. Clarke's book with
him tomorrow but all of the accusations, questioning motives, and calculations during that
time, when the attack was launched in Afghanistan and Sudan, there was a movie out called
Wag the Dog. There were critics of the Clinton administration that attacked the president
saying this was an effort on his part to divert attention from his personal difficulties.
I'd like to say, for the record, under no circumstances did President Clinton ever call
upon the military and use that military in order to serve a political purpose. When I took
the office, I had a very clear understanding with the president. He was very clear with
me. Under no circumstances would I ever be called upon to exercise any kind of partisan
relationship, would participate in no politics and would never allow the military to be
used for a political purpose. President Clinton was true to his word. He never called upon
us to do that. It was strictly on the merits. Now, that accusation surfaced again, and it
was something of concern to me. I'll take just a few moments to express it. In that fall,
I should say that winter, in December of 1998, we decided to attack Saddam Hussein. It was
called Operation Desert Fox. It was a four-day operation in which we launched a number of
attacks upon his weapons of mass destruction sites, his missile production facilities and
killing a number of Republican Guards and others. I got a call the day that that operation
was launched. I received a call from Speaker Gingrich and soon-to-be or then-to-be Speaker
Livingston asking me to come up to Capitol Hill. They said the House was in an uproar.
There was a rage boiling in the House of Representatives. This clearly had to be
politically inspired. I was eager to go up to the Hill. I had not been in the House of
Representatives for 20 years and I walked that evening into the well of the House of
Representatives. There were almost 400 people there that night, maybe more too a closed
session of Congress.
(Page 52 of 83)
COHEN: And I spoke for three hours, assuring every single member that the reason we
attacked Saddam Hussein was because of his noncompliance with the security council
resolution, that at no time did the president of the United States ever seek to use that
military strike in order to avoid or divert attention from the impeachment process. I was
prepared at that time and today to say -- I put my entire public career on the line to say
that the president always acted specifically upon the recommendation of those of us who
held the positions of responsibility to take military action. And at no time did he ever
try to use it or manipulate it to serve his personal ends. And I think it's important that
that be clear, because that Wag the Dog cynicism that was so virulent there, I'm afraid is
coming back again. I think we did everything we can to stop engaging in the kind of
self-flagellation and criticism and challenging of motives of our respective presidents.
FIELDING: Thank you. That also is the conclusion of the staff in the staff report. But
I'm glad you had a chance to elucidate on it. On August 20th...
KEAN: Last question.
FIELDING: OK. Thank you. On August 20th, we heard about General Shelton undertaking a
planning order for preparation of a follow-on operations, and obviously there were never
any follow-on operations that came to fruition. But what directions did you give the
military for development of military plans against bin Laden after August 20th for our
guidance? COHEN: Our plans were to try to, quote, capture and/or kill -- or kill, I should
say in this particular case -- capture or kill bin Laden. That was the directive that went
out, the memorandum of notification. The president had signed several of those, refining
them on each and every occasion. Taking that directive, we had our people in a position,
should there be, quote, actionable intelligence -- again, the key word. And we can -- we
should discuss that and debate that issue of what constitutes it.
COHEN: But whenever there was, quote, actual intelligence, we were prepared to take
action to destroy bin Laden or the targets. Were there plans to use Special Forces to
supplement the Northern Alliance that they were able to apprehend and hold on to bin
Laden? The answer was yes. There were packages that were developed with our Special Forces
at Fort Bragg. There were a number of proposals quote, on the table or on a shelf,
prepared to be utilized in the event that we were certain -- and not certain to 100
percent degree -- but reasonably certain that he was going to be at a given area. I know a
question has been raised, Well, why wouldn't you put a unit in there with the anticipation
that they could help gather intelligence and track him down? And I've tried to address
this in my written statement. But consider the notion, we have 13,500 troops in
Afghanistan right now, not to mention the Pakistanis, and we can't find bin Laden to date.
So the notion that you're going to put a small unit, however good, on the ground, or a
large unit, and put them into Afghanistan and track down bin Laden, I think is folly. But
if we had people on the ground, if we had the Northern Alliance, if they were reliable,
did we have people prepared to go? The answer was yes. General Shelton, I think, will tell
you, it's very difficult to kill an individual with a missile. We all know that. You're
talking about six hours from the time you, quote, spun-up, you've got the coordinates, GPS
signals -- target that individual. You're six hours away. To put troops on the ground was
probably double that time. By the time you take a package and fly them from Fort Bragg or
compose some elements that were already in the Gulf, you're talking more than six hours.
So the answer is, why don't have you forces on the ground in Afghanistan? And the point
I'm simply trying to make is that the notion that you could put thousands or hundreds or
even tens of people on the ground and hope to locate him under those circumstances, I
think, is simply unrealistic.
FIELDING: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
KEAN: Senator Kerrey?
KERREY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, nice to see you again.
COHEN: Good to see you, Senator.
(Page 53 of 83)
KERREY: First of all, let me say, as you were introducing yourself, I had not until I
prepared for this hearing realized -- then you reinforced it -- that you were the father
of the Special Operations Command. And it must have given you a considerable amount of
pride to see how effective special operations units were in Afghanistan, Iraq and,
according to the reports today in the Hindu Kush again, trying to run down bin Laden as we
speak.
COHEN: Senator Kerrey, you may recall one of the complaints that used to come from the
Pentagon and the executive branch is that Congress engages in too much micromanagement. I
think that was the case. And also the reformation of the joint chiefs of staff of
Goldwater-Nichols of macromanagement. But I thought it played a very important role.
KERREY: Certainly. Both of those were. And they want you to micromanage when they've
got something they want you to support. (LAUGHTER) But let me also say with great respect,
I do think that in '98, that a special operations unit with an element of surprise could
have had a tremendous impact at that particular point. It's a judgment call you've got to
make. It's a much different situation than it is today. And I appreciate that very much.
Look, one of the problems I think that I have with this whole thing is that we were
attacked on the 11th of September 2001 by the same people that attacked the Cole on the
12th of October 2000, by the same people who attempted to attack The Sullivans a few
months earlier, by the same people who were responsible for multiple millennium attacks in
1999, by the same people who attacked our embassies on the 7th of August, 1998, and now,
as we understand it, by the same people who have had previous attacks back to the 1990s,
perhaps up to and including the World Trade Center bombing one. So it's not just that we
were attacked successfully by 19 men with less than a half a million dollars utterly. I
mean they just defeated every single defensive mechanism we had up in place. It's that
this is the same group that had attacked us on many other occasions in the past. And
that's why I keep coming to the question, of why would we have a presidential directive in
place in 1998 that said that the Department of Defense and our military was going to be
used principally for a response, if we were attacked in a local and state situation, and
to support what the Department of Justice was doing. I don't understand why the military
wasn't given a priority and a primary role in the fight against not just terrorism, but
the fight against Osama bin Laden. I mean, I presume you've seen the declaration of war
that he released on the 23rd of February, 1998. That was very precise. Again, issued by
somebody who had demonstrated not just a willingness to kill Americans, but the capacity
to kill Americans. And every single time I heard the administration come up before the
Intelligence Committee that I was on, maybe just trying to keep doing what you had done
for years before, it was, We're going to send the FBI to investigate this stuff.
And I would say, My god, I don't understand this. They killed airmen in Khobar Towers.
They attacked our facilities in East Africa. They attacked our sailors on the Cole. I
don't understand, and still today don't understand, why the military wasn't given a
dominant role. And I wonder, if you're looking back on it today, do you think we
underutilized the military during the 1990s in the war against in this case, radical
Islamists, led by Osama bin Laden?
COHEN: First of all, I've seen your comments about the need to declare war against Al
Qaida. We were at war with Al Qaida. We weren't declaring it as such and the president
going to Congress saying, Let's declare war against Al Qaida. I take your point about bin
Laden being very precise. He was very precise in issuing a personal fatwa against me. I
was put on the list. There was a price tag. There were several attempts, which I don't
have to go into details about, going after me. So I was very much aware that this was a
war that had been declared against the United States, including members of the president's
Cabinet personally, putting us at risk, as well as our military personnel. The use of the
military -- the only use I could have seen in terms of could we have done more against bin
Laden, it was really talked about putting a massive force into Afghanistan over the
objection -- you've heard this this morning, and it's something that I had to take into
account: Could we in fact take a much more aggressive military operation against bin Laden
without the support of Pakistan or any of the neighboring countries? General Zinni's name
has been surfaced on several occasions here. When you recommend people to advise you --
and I was the one who recommended that General Zinni be the commander of the CENTCOM --
you look at their background, you look at their war records, you look at how they've
conducted themselves and you hopefully trust their judgment. General Zinni made a number
of recommendations, which I took to heart, because he was of the opinion that had we taken
certain types military action, it would have been, quote, ineffective, counterproductive.
He was the same general who recommended that we not overreact when there was a military
coup in Pakistan, saying, Wait a minute, I've worked with this general. I think we may be
able to persuade him to be much more supportive than he has been than we think in the
past. As a result of that kind of relationship that General Zinni had with General
Musharraf -- President Musharraf, later President Musharraf -- we were able to help thwart
attacks during the millennium. So you have to at some point put some judgment in the
experts that you call upon to give you advice. Could I have second guessed the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, General Shelton? Yes. Could I have second guessed General Zinni? Did I
have reason to, based upon my experience with them? And the answer was no.
(Page 54 of 83)
COHEN: I put a lot of faith in their recommendations and their judgment, and I never
found them, quote, risk averse. They really were more mission successful in their
orientation -- saying if we do this, we're likely to succeed, if we do the following,
we're likely to fail. Those were the kinds of decisions we had to make. So, what could
have been done? We had lethal authority. Sandy Berger said we weren't trying to send
simply a summons to bin Laden in Afghanistan, we were trying to kill him -- him or anyone
else who was there at the time. That was, you know, what they call a warning shot to the
temple. We were trying to kill bin Laden -- and anyone there that went to that camp. Did
we have the kind of information that would have allowed to us get him later? We didn't see
it. It was never recommended. I can't account for everything that you've heard, but there
was never a recommendation that came to the national security team that said: We've got a
good shot at getting him, let's take military action and do it. The only other alternative
would have been: Could we have persuaded Pakistan, Get out of the way, we're coming, we
don't need your support, we're going to invade Afghanistan ? I leave it to you, Senator
Kerrey, and to others who have served in Congress. Do you think it's reasonable that under
the circumstances that any president, including President Clinton, could have gone to
Congress in October of 2000 and said, These people are trying to kill us, and now
therefore we're going to invade Afghanistan and take them out. I don't think so. But other
members can disagree. A judgment call. You sat on the other side of that decision.
KERREY: Well, that presumes that the president would come to Congress and request
authorization for action there. But as you know, there have been many moments when the
president doesn't request such authorization. He just does it.
COHEN: Can I make -- let me make one other point. One other point. You remember Kosovo.
KERREY: Yes.
COHEN: Here we had a campaign going on in Kosovo. I don't know how many times you came
to the White House, but there were meetings after meetings with members of Congress coming
down to the president saying, This is a bad idea, when are you going to get out? What's
the exit strategy? How much is it going to cost us? We had to sustain a 78-day bombing
campaign -- frankly, without the support of Congress. And it was a successful campaign.
And as a result of that, we saved a lot of lives. But I give you that as an example to say
the notion that somehow President Clinton or even President Bush -- absent 9/11 -- could
have walked into the halls of Congress, say, Declare war against Al Qaida, I think is
unrealistic.
KERREY: But, Mr. Secretary, I must say you're making my argument. I supported what the
president did in Kosovo. I supported what he did in Bosnia. I was in the minority in both
times. But that didn't stop him from doing it. The fact that it was difficult, the fact
that it was hard, the fact even at times that it was unpopular -- he believed in it, and
he rallied the American people to the cause.
COHEN: He also rallied allies.
KERREY: He didn't rally, he didn't do that with bin Laden. C
OHEN: But he also rallied allies to the cause. You had the NATO countries involved in
Bosnia and Kosovo. You have, after 9/11, you have him rallying the international community
to help go into Afghanistan. Prior to that time, I dare say there is not a single country
that would have been supporting the president of the United States declaring war and
invading Afghanistan prior to 9/11. You can disagree with that judgment. I don't think
there was a single country, and I frankly think that Congress would have overwhelmingly
rejected it. KERREY: I would disagree. I respectfully disagree. First of all, again, as I
said, there are many instances where the president doesn't even come to Congress.
Operation Just Cause in Panama. He didn't come to Congress and say, Gee, is it OK to do
that? Grenada -- the president didn't come to Congress and said, Is that OK to do it? In
Bosnia and Kosovo, the very examples that you cite, the president didn't have the support
of Congress, and he went ahead and did. I think he did the right thing. But the fact that
it's unpopular, that it's difficult, that our allies are not necessarily with it shouldn't
deter a president who believes that what we have is a serial killer on our hands who had
begun killing us at least as early as 1993, who had issued a very specific declaration of
war calling Islamic men to join an Islamic army on the 23rd of February, 1998, and then
demonstrated that he had the capacity in a very sophisticated way on the 7th of August to
carry out that threat. We had a round in our chamber and we didn't use it. That's how I
see it. And I don't know if it had prevented 9/11. But I absolutely do not believe that
just because a commander in chief sits there and said, Gee, this thing is unpopular
therefore I can't do it, I don't think that's a good argument. I know Secretary Rumsfeld
is going to use it here in a few minutes and I'm going to be just as harsh with him. I
don't buy it.
(Page 55 of 83)
COHEN: Well, Senator Kerrey, let's go back to the Persian Gulf war of '91. There you
had Saddam Hussein invading Kuwait. There you had the president of the United States,
President Bush 41, going to the international community, gathering support, and then
deciding to come to the Congress to get congressional support. Close call. I think it
passed the Senate by four votes under those extraordinary circumstances. But I would
submit to you the notion that you'd be able in the fall of 2000 to have rallied the
Congress and the country to invade Afghanistan and to have had the support of Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, all of the other people in the region, I don't think is realistic.
COHEN: Judgment call -- we can be faulted for that. I just don't think it was feasible.
KERREY: Well, I would just say for the record: Better have tried and failed than not to
try at all. And I think in this particular case, again, what you've got, the thing that's
most troubling about 9/11 is that it was carried out by the same group of people that had
killed Americans the previous October, that had tried to kill Americans on the (inaudible)
just before that in the Summer of 2000. It's a series of events stretching back for a
decade. That's the problem.
COHEN: And we would...
KERREY: With a declaration of war by he guy who's leading the organization.
COHEN: And we were trying to kill those members whenever we could find them. But you're
not talking about people sitting in a city waiting to be attacked. It's like mercury on a
mirror. You're talking about individuals who can hide. I mean let's look at what's taking
place today. I point out again, you've got thousands of people on the ground in
Afghanistan with the support of Pakistan, and we still are unable to track him down and to
kill him.
KERREY: But if you look at the performance of the Special Operations units in Northern
Afghanistan and the war against Afghanistan, and they leveraged thousands of GIs effort,
they were enormously effective.
COHEN: I agree.
KERREY: Likewise in Iraq and likewise again right now in Afghanistan.
COHEN: I agree. I think we owe them a tremendous amount of gratitude for all of the
sacrifice they make and the training they have. That's the reason we are the finest in the
world, because of that training.
: What was the military objective on 20 August, 1998?
COHEN: The military objective was to kill as many people in those camps as we could, to
take out the pharmaceutical plant because we had reason to believe -- actionable
intelligence.
KERREY: But there were more men south of Kandahar than there was up by the coast. Why
did we attack that particular camp?
COHEN: Because intelligence was that we believed that bin Laden and his associates were
going to be there. We went after as many as we could and as high as we could. We didn't
know whether he'd be there for sure. We hoped he would be there. He slipped away
apparently.
KERREY: Did you consider putting a special ops -- a relatively small special ops team
just to get eyes on the prize -- just to be able to be sort of forward air controllers,
rather than having to rely on satellites or tribals to tell you where bin Laden was?
COHEN: I think that the judgment was that it was a more discrete operation likely to be
less compromised than if we tried to put people on the ground at that time. Again, you can
question that judgment, but that was a recommendation coming that had the best chance of
success of getting him.
KERREY: We're going to hear from Secretary Rumsfeld in a little bit and I want to ask
you one last question in that regard. During the transition, you briefed the secretary on
50 items and also briefed him on Al Qaida. And perhaps he's going to recall, but in a
previous interview, he didn't remember much about the briefing on Al Qaida. Can you offer
any reasons why?
COHEN: I listed -- since I had limited time with Secretary Rumsfeld, I knew that he had
-- was quite familiar with the office. And what I tried to do is to give him the whole
panoply in a very short period of time knowing that there were going to be specific
briefings by the chairman of the joint chiefs and others, the joint staff, the national
security adviser and, also, the CIA.
(Page 56 of 83)
COHEN: So we tried to cover as many subjects as we could. The very first subject had to
do with a major threat to the United States involving Al Qaida or bin Laden's associates,
but an extremist group launching an attack domestically. I don't think I want to talk
about it any more than that, but that was a number one item. Everything else on the item
were issues that I thought he should at least be aware of, but number one was my concern.
And frankly I came to Capitol Hill. I met I think with just a total of perhaps eight to 10
people to talk about the threat that existed and what needed to be done what needed to be
done to help counter it. I don't think I want to talk about it more.
KERREY: I made the same conclusion, Mr. Secretary. But as I said at the beginning,
Goldwater-Nichols, Special Operations Command, the men and women of the Air Force, Army,
Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard that won the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, that was your
troops and you ought to feel very proud of it.
COHEN: Thank you very much, Senator.
KEAN: Governor Thompson. THOMPSON: Mr. Secretary, let me see if I could get this
straight. We've been talking for the last half hour on the issue of a response to the USS
Cole. If I understand the testimony of a lot of people, the Clinton administration didn't
believe it had proof sufficient of Al Qaida's responsibility before they left office, and
perhaps the Bush administration felt it wasn't on their watch and they had other fish to
fry. And passing that, you seemed to suggest in your answer to an earlier question that
the only option for a military reprisal for the bombing of the Cole was an invasion of
Afghanistan. And I think most people would agree -- and certainly prior testimony has
cited -- that that was just not an appropriate response. We had no place to forward base
from. We had no coalition. It was much different than Kosovo where we had overflight
rights and we had allies. But am I wrong in believing that just as appropriate a response
would have been action against the Taliban, not necessarily just against Osama bin Laden
and his Al Qaida followers. We knew where Mullah Omar lived, presumably. What about a
missile strike on Taliban facilities, not just their training camps, but on their civil
seats of government? There would have been collateral damage, yes, but I think you said
you were willing to accept collateral damage. And the 13 sailors we lost in the Cole were
not collateral damage, they were direct damage. Was any consideration given to reprisals
against the institutions and facilities, civil government of the Taliban, for the Cole?
COHEN: There were a number of proposals. And I can't recall specifically, but I think
Mr. Clarke may be talking about those tomorrow. But there were a number of recommendations
to go in and flatten a number of areas.
During that time, we did not have specific information this was bin Laden. Frankly,
that was my suspicion. It could have been other Islamic extremists that were operating out
of Yemen. We found out in retrospect there had been a previous attack that was
unsuccessful against The Sullivan. But that was my suspicion. We were trying to get bin
Laden in any event. Whether it was before the Cole or after the Cole, we were still
looking for ways in which we might attack bin Laden. So some recommendations to actually
just flatten a number of areas. It was the considered judgment at the time that that would
not have either gotten bin Laden or have resulted in a positive reaction by either
Pakistan -- that we were courting at that point to try and persuade them join us in this
effort -- or any of the others in the region. So, it was determined, again, that it would
have not been effective, and it might have been counterproductive. That was a judgment
call at the time. As the secretary of defense, I have to make recommendations to the
president. I have to do so certainly filled with passion in terms of what had happened to
the Cole. I went to those funerals and services and I met with all the families, and so it
was pretty important to me that I had to also take into account what would have been the
impact of launching an attack against the Taliban at that point, when we didn't have the
support of Pakistan, who was officially still supporting the Taliban. Would that have been
counterproductive and less effective? Our judgment was that it would not have been
effective, and we didn't do it.
(Page 57 of 83)
THOMPSON: Do you think it's appropriate to assert, as some people have, that one of the
first acts of a brand new national administration, in this case the Bush administration,
would have been to go to war over the Cole?
COHEN: No. I think the first act of the administration is to assess all of the
information it can, to make an informed judgment, to take actions, not only one action,
but to see what are the consequences of that action. I don't think any administration
should take a precipitous action. They should look at the facts and then make a
determination: What are the consequences of this, what is the follow-up? If we take action
to attack the Taliban, how much will it take? How many forces? All of these factors have
to be taken into account, and I think you never take step one without asking yourself:
What's step five and six? Where are we? So, no, I don't fault the administration for not
doing that immediately.
THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
KEAN: Commissioner Gorelick.
GORELICK: Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony today. It is quite impressive, as
always, very thoughtful and broad-gauged. I have been troubled about something that
perhaps you can help on.
GORELICK: You were in these meetings where the various possibilities of getting Osama
bin Laden were discussed. We now have huge and selective leaks coming from various levels
of the CIA who are saying, We really had him. We had great intelligence. We could have
gotten him, and the policymakers overruled us. At the same time you have Sandy Berger, and
I think yourself, and others, saying, No, the director of CIA told us the intelligence was
not good enough and he was not recommending going forward. That leaves us in a very
peculiar position. Either the people below George Tenet didn't know what was happening
above his level, or at his level, or he was telling them one thing and telling you
another, or maybe there is some third possibility. But this is an important issue for us
to understand: Did we have it? Did we not have it? Was it good? Was it not good? And how
could there be this dispute on something so fundamental? And I would just like your view
on this.
COHEN: There are 23,000 people who work at the Pentagon. Secretary Lehman probably
knows from his own experience how disconcerting that can be in terms of trying to maintain
control and to maintain the flow information coming up through the department of the Navy
or the department of defense.
There were 3,000 people on the Office of Secretary of Defense staff that we tried to
reduce by a third. That was one of my goals in taking the office itself, but 2,000 people
in the Office of Secretary of Defense. I can assure you, there are people inside the
Pentagon who say, If only they had listened to me. If only this memo had gotten to the
boss, we would have taken the following action. I think all policymakers have to come to
the following conclusion: You are judged by the people that you appoint. You pick the best
people you can, you rely upon their judgment. If you find that you have to question their
credibility or their judgment, you get rid of them. But the notion that somehow there is
somebody down in the bowels that has a different view, or has submitted a different
analysis that if only had you gotten to the right people would have made a difference, I
think you have to take that into account. But if the director of central intelligence
says, We don't have it, then you have to rely upon that. If he says, We do have it, you
rely upon that as well and say, OK, under these circumstances, we take the following
action.
COHEN: If the chairman of the joint chiefs comes to me and says, I recommend the
following, you have to rely upon that unless you doubt his actions. I'll give you an
example. The chairman of the joint chiefs, I selected him for that position because he was
the commander of Special Operations Command. For that specific reason, I wanted to have
more emphasis placed upon Special Forces than we had placed in the past. I saw what he
did. And I put this in my written testimony. I saw what he did in Bosnia and Kosovo. We
had some operation called the PIFWICs. These were persons who had been indicted for war
crimes. And they were so- called snatch operations. I saw some of the plans that were put
into effect to grab certain people. I saw Chairman Shelton saying, Don't do it that way.
Here's a better way. Here's how you're really going to make this thing successful. So I
came to see how he operated and to rely upon his judgment. And if I had any doubts that he
was giving me the straight information, which I never had, then I would have been derelict
in my duty in not calling him on it. So I think you have to take into account one of the
challenges that this commission faces, all of us face: How do we have better vertical
integration? You've had information about what took place in some of the field offices and
the FBI, information that didn't get put up the line, didn't get shared horizontally. How
do we construct a system that allows for better vertical information of intelligence and
then horizontal cross-fertilization or sharing that information? Tough job. You've got
different cultures. You've got different sources and methods and standards. But it has to
be done. Now, it will never deal with the issue that you're raising now. If someone at
whatever level, second, third, fourth level down says I have a better idea, or, I have
information, it's just not getting to the right people. You will always have that problem.
But you have to rely upon the judgment of the people that you appoint.
GORELICK: But you are convinced that the director of central intelligence in these
instances said to you and your fellow policymakers, We don't have it.
(Page 58 of 83)
COHEN: On every occasion, he said that exactly. He would come in initially because he
was getting some raw information, saying I think we're going to have it, that we do have
it. And then he would go back and he would refine it and after, again, we were prepared to
take action to say, We don't think so. To his credit, I mean this is not a fault of George
Tenet. This is to his credit, saying, Let's be as sure as we can. If we're going to kill
people, innocent people, as well as carrying out this operation, let's be as sure as we
can that we've got the right target, the right information, and minimize if we can,
killing innocent people. That's his job, and I think he did it well.
GORELICK: Thank you.
KEAN:Senator Gorton? GORTON: Mr. Secretary, help me, with your experience and wisdom,
with this very troubling two-word phrase...
COHEN: Actionable intelligence. GORTON: ... actionable intelligence. It seems to me
that actionable intelligence, with respect to going after Osama bin Laden after 1988, must
have been based on the proposition that almost the sole goal is getting, capturing or
killing Osama bin Laden, and that what a lack of actionable intelligence meant was either,
one, you didn't have a 90 percent chance of finding him where whatever intelligence you
had said he would be; or, two, if you could, you were going to kill 300 or 400 other
people while you were doing it, that the collateral damage would be too great to run the
risk. But actionable intelligence on August 20th, after the embassy bombings, it seems to
me must have been softer than that, and actionable intelligence must have been, Well, we
know there is a camp there and we're pretty sure there are going to be some bad guys
there. And besides blowing up those two things, it was so bad we've got to do something.
Tell me if that's correct. But most of all, tell me what, in general terms for the future,
actionable intelligence means. How much of it is the goal? How much of it is your
certainty that you can attain that goal? And how much of it is just related to the fact
that under some circumstances you're going to have to do something even though you aren't
certain that you'll be a success?
COHEN: Senator Gorton, let me give you a real case involving actionable intelligence,
the so-called pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. I want to use that as an example because
there we were given information that bin Laden, following the bombings of the embassies in
East Africa, was seeking to get his hands on chemical and biological weapons to kill as
many people as he could. We were real concerned about that. I was very concerned about
that.
COHEN: Intelligence started to come in about this particular plant. They had been
gathering information on it, and I think I point this out in my written testimony, but,
frankly, I apologize for not getting it to you much sooner. I was still working on it as
of yesterday, last night. But to give you an example, this particular facility, according
to the intelligence we had at that time, had been constructed under extraordinary security
circumstances, even with some surface-to-air missile capability or defense capabilities.
That the plant itself had been constructed under the security measures, that the plant had
been funded, in part, by the so-called military industrial corporation, that bin Laden had
been living there, that he had in fact money that he had put into this military industrial
corporation, that the owner of the plant had traveled to Baghdad to meet with the father
of the VX program, and that the CIA had found traces of EMTA nearby the facility itself.
According to all the intelligence, there was no other known use for EMTA at that time
other than as a precursor to VX. Under those circumstances, I said, that's actionable
enough for me -- that that plant could in fact be producing not baby aspirin or some other
pharmaceutical for the benefit of the people, but it was enough for me to say we should
take it out -- and I recommended that. Now, I was criticized for that, saying, you didn't
have enough. And I put myself in the position of coming before you and having someone like
you say to me, Let me get this straight, Mr. Secretary, we've just had a chemical weapons
attack upon our cities or our troops and we've lost several hundred or several thousand.
And this is the information which you had at your fingertips. You had a plant that was
built under the following circumstances, had you manager that went to Baghdad, you had
Osama bin Laden who had funded at least the corporation, and you had traces of EMTA and
did you what? You did nothing? Is that a responsible activity on the part of the Secretary
of Defense? And the answer is pretty clear. So I was satisfied, even though that still is
pointed as a mistake, that it was the right thing to do then. I would do it again, based
on that kind of intelligence. So that was an example of actionable intelligence. When it
comes to other circumstances, you have to weigh it, each and every case. You say, do you
take action just for the sake of taking it, saying do something? I think we have a greater
responsibility. Before I decide or make a recommendation to the president of the United
States to launch a missile that's going to kill a lot of people, I want to make sure as
much as I can it's not out of passion, but out of as much reasoned analysis as I can make
to say, This is a target that poses a threat to us, Mr. President.
(Page 59 of 83)
COHEN: And yes, there are risks that you're going to kill some innocent people, but we
have an obligation to take it out. It's individual analysis. I can't give you specifics on
it. I gave you an example of where I thought it was the right thing.
GORTON: Thoughtful answer. It preempted any further questions. (LAUGHTER)
KEAN: Secretary Lehman.
LEHMAN: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to follow up on Senator Kerrey's line of inquiry.
COHEN: Good Navy man does that.
LEHMAN: I always follow the black shoes. The question I have is, in the testimony of a
number of the witnesses we've had, and of course, in Mr. Clarke's book, your Pentagon
comes in for a lot of criticism for basically -- along two lines, the most important of
which is that whenever there was an opportunity and a request for options, when the
president requested options and so forth, the only thing the Joint Chiefs could come up
with, the Pentagon could come up with, was either lob a few cruise missiles or the
Normandy invasion. And I recall the debates over the creation of the Special Operations
Command in which I was initially skeptical and became a strong advocate as you laid out
the case very well for that legislation, which was to provide a president with something
in between, a much more discriminating set of options, between the kind of things that
came out of the chiefs all those decades, which is either launch an alpha strike from the
carriers, send in the 101 Airborne, or carpet bomb with B-52s. And yet, it seems that
every time that a request was made for some set of options -- at least this is the
testimony we have -- the alternative was always given, Well, we can't invade Afghanistan,
Congress will never do it, so the only thing we have is to fire a few cruise missiles. And
clearly, as Senator Kerrey was suggesting, there are lots of potential discrete options in
between, like putting specialized Special Operations forces on the ground.
(Page 60 of 83)
LEHMAN: Now this is before. Yes, it takes 13,000 today and they can't find him. But
before the war in Afghanistan, there was a lot -- he was much more accessible. So there
were options. But somehow the Special Operations Command -- either did not because it was,
as our staff pointed out, a supporting rather than a supported command or because not much
has changed after all these years with the new operations command -- did not come up with
discrete options. Why was that? And is Mr. Clarke's criticism a valid one?
COHEN: Well, first, I would take issue with the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can
only go from B-1 bombers or cruise missiles or the Normandy invasion. If you look at what
took place in both Bosnia and Kosovo, Special Forces played a key role over there in terms
of some of these operations. So JSOACC was always on tap to do whatever was reasonable to
do. I would have to place my judgment call in terms of: Do I believe that the chairman of
the joint chiefs, former commander of Special Forces Command, is in a better position to
make a judgment about the feasibility of this and perhaps, Mr. Clarke? I had to make that
kind of a call. Was Richard Clarke in a better position to say this has a greater chance
of success or General Shelton? I indicated that I relied upon the senior military adviser
to me, the president for the national security team. I have no reason to in any way ever
doubt that he was very straight with me and was not trying to rig the system so you only
had one of two options. But, rather, I think he always felt we are prepared to take action
to put Special Forces on the ground if there is a reasonable opportunity to achieve the
mission. To do anything less than that, to put those young people at risk with the
enormity of the task of that country, that size, with that many caves with, by the way,
the support of the Taliban, and not the support of Pakistan, I'd have to question whether
or not that was reasonable to do so. I did. And I supported the chairman saying, this
doesn't make a good deal of sense in terms of putting those young men's lives at risk when
the potential for success is very limited, if not de minimus.
LEHMAN: You'll be pleased to know that he's even harsher on the CIA's capability in
these kinds of...
COHEN: Everybody can be critical. You can criticize the agency, criticize DOD. The real
issue is: What action do we take from here?
COHEN: Where are the fault lines? Where does fault lie? If you think that we were
irresponsible in not putting a small unit into Afghanistan when you had virtually no
support activities. For example, I mentioned this operations in Kosovo. They had
incredible intelligence support just tens of miles away. Now you're going to put a small
unit of Special Forces into Afghanistan, where there is no intelligence support miles
away, but thousands of miles away. What do you do in terms of search and rescue? This is
something I know you were concerned about certainly as secretary of the Navy. What about
CSAR? If we lose one of our pilots, or lose one of our people, you got to send in search
and rescue. Well, how about refuelers for the C-130 gunships, et cetera? All of those
factors were involved on the part of military planning. Do you just put special forces in
and say, we know how good you are, go do the job and good luck? The answer is no. You try
to make sure you protect them as much as you can and measure the probability of success
against the risk that they are put at. LEHMAN: That brings me to the point of these
questions really. Many witnesses have criticized CIA for really not having the capability
for covert operations and special operations. And yet they've been called upon to do them.
On the other hand, the Pentagon has been criticized because they don't want to do them.
And so I guess the question that has arisen in our minds is, perhaps there should be a
straightforward assignment of the counterterrorism mission to SOCOM and not pretend CIA
can do it with civilians and not leave the Special Operations Command as just a supporting
operation to the CINCs who are not likely to have the kind of focus for doing this. What
would you think of that kind of reform?
(Page 61 of 83)
COHEN: Well, actually, I think that Secretary Rumsfeld may be in the process of
recommending that. I think he may see the use of Special Forces in a way that achieves
that kind of more centralized role than being a support element and being a more central
player in terms of Special Forces designed to go out and kill or capture a number of the
terrorist groups. I will also offer another comment, if I can, in this war on terror. It's
my own personal judgment that the war on terror is, for the most part, not going to be won
on the battlefield. I really believe that ultimately, aside from Iraq, which is a big
aside, but aside from Iraq, I believe the war has to be wage by the sharing of information
on almost a global basis. Again, I pointed my opening statement that we're all at risk
now.
COHEN: We have to start sharing information, and it's going to require good police
work, sort of what the Brits did by knocking down the door and finding a group of people
with ricin in their possession -- sharing that kind of information, and covert operations,
police work, Special Forces, and ultimately, finally, the military option. But I think
that that's really what's going to be required for the war against terror. And I think
Special Forces being charged with a higher level of activity is probably warranted.
LEHMAN: One final question. Another line of criticism from a fair number of our
witnesses has been that in making decisions and recommendations from commanders for action
of this type, that there has been a huge growth in the role of general counsel, shall we
say, epitomized by the CENTCOM general counsel advising the CINC that he could not shoot
at Omar because that would violate the assassination order. Just as a phenomenon -- well,
I know that didn't happen on your watch, but just as an issue, it seems to us time and
time again we see in interviews and queries that every one seems to be afraid to move in
the policy level, and particularly in the Pentagon, without having a CYA memo from the
legal counsel.
COHEN: I was not aware of any inhibition or prohibition against the Pentagon taking
action directed against Osama bin Laden or anyone else. There was no question in my mind
that both the agency and the military had complete authority to take whatever lethal
action was necessary. I never saw anything that would have inhibited that.
LEHMAN: Thank you.
KEAN: Congressman Roemer?
ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you again for a very, very
helpful and thought-provoking statement that you gave us. I want to probe and push a
little bit harder on two things that you've already talked about a little bit. One is the
decision to fire the missiles into Sudan at El-Shifa plant. You've outlined in very
specific detail three or four reasons why you decided to do that and why you might have
regretted doing that at a later point.
COHEN: No, I never regretted doing that.
ROEMER: There were three or four reasons you are glad you did it and why those things
could have come back to haunt you if...
COHEN: OK, all right.
ROEMER: You can clarify my question and your answer. (LAUGHTER) With respect to Sudan,
every single person in the Clinton administration has told us that it was a very difficult
decision, that they didn't have regrets about it, as you have not had any regrets about
it, and that they were roundly criticized for it, not only because there was some theory
on Capitol Hill about Wag the Dog, which you have clarified, I think, in your remarks, but
I want to push you harder on the other part of this.
ROEMER: A couple of the people, including Sandy Berger in the private sessions with us,
said they remembered the editorials across the country saying they didn't get bin Laden.
They created, according to an Economist article, the Economist accused them of maybe
creating a hundred Osama bin Ladens because they did not kill him with the cruise missile
strikes. How does that not impact to some degree your decision, subsequently, when you're
having these kinds of decisions come forward to make the tough call, as you did in this
particular instance?
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COHEN: It had no impact. I looked at the question. I was satisfied. I regret that one
life was lost during that particular attack. We were very precise. We timed it, as a
matter of fact, so there would be very few, in any, people at the plant. It was at
nighttime. It was timed simultaneously with the attack, virtually, in Afghanistan, so that
we didn't lose the surprise element. And we tried to minimize any collateral damage to the
extent that we could. But we were prepared to take that down. The wag the dog issue I
think was unfortunate. It was untrue. But that was something that reality of what was
taking place on Capitol Hill. As far as the criticism was concerned, it had no deterrent
whatsoever in terms of our commitment to look for, hunt for and to capture or kill bin
Laden. I do want to urge one cautionary note. And that is that even though it's important
to capture or kill bin Laden, I think that we should understand that doesn't end it, any
more than capturing Saddam Hussein has stopped some of the terrorist actions. I think that
we have seen Al Qaida is not -- it doesn't have a central headquarters. It doesn't fly a
flag. It is spread through many countries. I know it can be argued that because there was
no prior action, it is even more disseminated now. But the fact is that we would take
action against bin Laden or his associates wherever we thought we could do so
successfully. What we didn't want to do was to take action that satisfied the passion of
the moment, that gave us a sense, well, we're doing something, but in fact had the effect
of simply generating opposition to what we were doing, undercutting the sharing of
intelligence cooperation, making our goal of actually capturing or killing him more
difficult.
COHEN: So that was the only hesitation we had: Does this action that is being proposed
have a probability of success? Is it likely to achieve our goal? Or is it more likely to
undercut our efforts? Those were the only considerations that we had.
ROEMER: I'm very happy to hear that. Let me ask you the question to look forward.
Secretary Rumsfeld, who will be with us momentarily, wrote a memo that I think outlined
the problem in the future absolutely to the point. And he said, as you have just
indicated, that the military is not the only weapon, that it's one of many arrows in the
quiver, one of many tools in the tool box to use. I'd like to push you a little bit harder
on a country that is absolutely critical to the United States in our future, and that's
Indonesia. What specifically, as these training camps produce this wrath of hatred and
jihadists, what can we do, even if we're out there with the military killing people and
trying to eliminate the terrorists and the jihadists, what can we do as they're cranking
out these human conveyor belts of terrorists, in education, in a place like Indonesia, to
replace the madrassas with a practical education? Or what can Indonesia do? What can we do
on IMET? What can we do reaching out to the moderates in the government there? How can we
begin to put new types of military and State Department and intel efforts to reach out to
these types of critically important countries in the future?
COHEN: Thank you, Congressman Roemer. You had the secretary of state here earlier,
Secretary Powell. And I think he laid out some of the, quote, diplomatic initiatives that
have to be undertaken. Some of it involves diplomacy. It involves the use of economic both
incentives and disincentives. It involves sanctions. It involves a variety of things. But
most of all, it requires engagement on the part of the United States in a very aggressive,
diplomatic fashion. Sheik Salman, who is the crown prince of Bahrain -- and if any of you
haven't had occasion to meet with him, I'd recommend that you talk to this young man. He's
one of most progressive young leaders that I have met in, certainly my travels, but
especially in the Gulf region, along with King Abdullah of Jordan.
COHEN: But Sheik Salman made an observation a few months ago which I endorse, basically
pointing to the problem that the United States has in dealing with this issue, that much
of the Arab world looks through two lenses: one lens focused on how we conduct ourselves
in Iraq, now that we're there, how we successfully resolve or achieve success in Iraq and
treat the Iraqi people in that process; and the other happens to do with the Middle East
conflict, that many Muslims throughout the world also look through the lens of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And so I think we have to become much more engaged there as
well, and that's why I mentioned that I don't think it should wait until November
elections are over. I think that we have to energize that process now. I have my own
thoughts about what needs to be done and have written about that. In addition to that,
we'd have to engage Indonesia diplomatically; military, the IMET program is one of the
most important programs that we have, the sharing of educational materials, exercises,
planning with other militaries. Because of the superiority I believe of the men and women
who serve us, because of their excellence in education, discipline, leadership,
follow-ship, all the things that make us the greatest force, military force, on the face
of the earth, we should be trying to share that talent, technology, techniques with other
countries. And, yes, they may be accused of not living up to our standards of human
rights. All the more reason why we should engage them, all the more reason why we have to
persuade them that this is the way a military has to operate, not with clubs and batons,
not with the law of rule, but the rule of law. That also has to take place. So IMET's
important. I think we also have to go to other countries who support the madrassas and say
that you are feeding the flames of future destruction here. That requires education, it
requires giving countries also a hope. I'll come back to the Palestinians for a moment.
Unless you see people who have an opportunity for either sovereignty, dignity and
opportunity, you are likely to see continued festering of violence in the region. So you
have to give people a sense of hope: economic hope, individual liberty in terms of their
opportunities -- all of that is involved. So that requires us to be engaged in a very
aggressive way diplomatically. The military, by the way, plays a role, a great role, in
diplomacy. We have our State Department, and they do an outstanding job with very limited
resources. But the military also plays a very big role.
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COHEN: When our men and women in uniform go to a country and the people are able to
judge them and see how good they are, how disciplined, how well-led, how technically
capable, et cetera, how good they are as human beings, they make a judgment about us. And
they say: We want to be like you. We want to have the same kind of capability. We want to
develop a relationship with you. We need to do more of that. And so every time there's an
issue that comes up on the Hill, they say, well, Abusive human rights; cut off IMET, we
should be holding on to IMET. I could be carry on at length about this particular
requirement, and I know that there are people on the Hill who would object to that. But I
think we have a better chance of influencing people in their judgments about us and
helping to persuade them that the way of the future is to have a military like that of the
United States and our allies to subordinate that military to civilian rule, to educate the
military, to help persuade them that they are in this war against terror with us -- all of
that comes about with diplomacy and a very strong military capability and diplomatic
effort.
LEHMAN: Thank you very much. I hope this commission will take into consideration those
very provocative and thoughtful recommendations into our recommendations at the end of the
day.
COHEN: Thank you.
KEAN: Secretary Cohen, thank you very, very much not only for your testimony today, but
I know you've given very generously of your time to this commission in private sessions
and with the staff. And for that, I thank you very much. I hope if we have additional
questions -- and I know we're going to want to talk to you a bit more as we get into our
recommendations -- that you will help us there also.
COHEN: OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
KEAN: Thank you very much.
LEHMAN: Now this is before. Yes, it takes 13,000 today and they can't find him. But
before the war in Afghanistan, there was a lot -- he was much more accessible. So there
were options. But somehow the Special Operations Command -- either did not because it was,
as our staff pointed out, a supporting rather than a supported command or because not much
has changed after all these years with the new operations command -- did not come up with
discrete options. Why was that? And is Mr. Clarke's criticism a valid one?
COHEN: Well, first, I would take issue with the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can
only go from B-1 bombers or cruise missiles or the Normandy invasion. If you look at what
took place in both Bosnia and Kosovo, Special Forces played a key role over there in terms
of some of these operations. So JSOACC was always on tap to do whatever was reasonable to
do. I would have to place my judgment call in terms of: Do I believe that the chairman of
the joint chiefs, former commander of Special Forces Command, is in a better position to
make a judgment about the feasibility of this and perhaps, Mr. Clarke? I had to make that
kind of a call. Was Richard Clarke in a better position to say this has a greater chance
of success or General Shelton? I indicated that I relied upon the senior military adviser
to me, the president for the national security team. I have no reason to in any way ever
doubt that he was very straight with me and was not trying to rig the system so you only
had one of two options. But, rather, I think he always felt we are prepared to take action
to put Special Forces on the ground if there is a reasonable opportunity to achieve the
mission. To do anything less than that, to put those young people at risk with the
enormity of the task of that country, that size, with that many caves with, by the way,
the support of the Taliban, and not the support of Pakistan, I'd have to question whether
or not that was reasonable to do so. I did. And I supported the chairman saying, this
doesn't make a good deal of sense in terms of putting those young men's lives at risk when
the potential for success is very limited, if not de minimus.
LEHMAN: You'll be pleased to know that he's even harsher on the CIA's capability in
these kinds of...
COHEN: Everybody can be critical. You can criticize the agency, criticize DOD. The real
issue is: What action do we take from here?
(Page 64 of 83)
COHEN: Where are the fault lines? Where does fault lie? If you think that we were
irresponsible in not putting a small unit into Afghanistan when you had virtually no
support activities. For example, I mentioned this operations in Kosovo. They had
incredible intelligence support just tens of miles away. Now you're going to put a small
unit of Special Forces into Afghanistan, where there is no intelligence support miles
away, but thousands of miles away. What do you do in terms of search and rescue? This is
something I know you were concerned about certainly as secretary of the Navy. What about
CSAR? If we lose one of our pilots, or lose one of our people, you got to send in search
and rescue. Well, how about refuelers for the C-130 gunships, et cetera? All of those
factors were involved on the part of military planning. Do you just put special forces in
and say, we know how good you are, go do the job and good luck? The answer is no. You try
to make sure you protect them as much as you can and measure the probability of success
against the risk that they are put at.
LEHMAN: That brings me to the point of these questions really. Many witnesses have
criticized CIA for really not having the capability for covert operations and special
operations. And yet they've been called upon to do them. On the other hand, the Pentagon
has been criticized because they don't want to do them. And so I guess the question that
has arisen in our minds is, perhaps there should be a straightforward assignment of the
counterterrorism mission to SOCOM and not pretend CIA can do it with civilians and not
leave the Special Operations Command as just a supporting operation to the CINCs who are
not likely to have the kind of focus for doing this. What would you think of that kind of
reform?
COHEN: Well, actually, I think that Secretary Rumsfeld may be in the process of
recommending that. I think he may see the use of Special Forces in a way that achieves
that kind of more centralized role than being a support element and being a more central
player in terms of Special Forces designed to go out and kill or capture a number of the
terrorist groups. I will also offer another comment, if I can, in this war on terror. It's
my own personal judgment that the war on terror is, for the most part, not going to be won
on the battlefield. I really believe that ultimately, aside from Iraq, which is a big
aside, but aside from Iraq, I believe the war has to be wage by the sharing of information
on almost a global basis. Again, I pointed my opening statement that we're all at risk
now.
KEAN: We will now hear from the secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Secretary
Rumsfeld has had wide experience in several senior positions throughout the government. We
are pleased to welcome him before us this afternoon. He's accompanied by his distinguished
deputy secretary of defense, Paul Wolfowitz, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Richard Myers. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Deputy Secretary, General Myers, we would
ask you if you could raise your right hand and so I may place you under oath. Do you swear
or affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?
RUMSFELD: I do.
WOLFOWITZ: I do.
MYERS: I do.
KEAN: Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, your written remarks will be entered into the
record in full. And we would ask you to summarize your remarks in the opening statement.
You may proceed. Thank you.
RUMSFELD: Thank you very much, Chairman and Vice Chairman and members of the
commission. I thank you for undertaking this important work. I would just mention that
General Myers and Paul Wolfowitz have been intimately involved in the work of the
department prior to September 11th, on September 11th and subsequent to September 11th.
First, let me express my condolences to the people of Spain. The March 11th bombings will
leave that nation changed. Certainly the families that lost loved ones on September 11th
-- some of whom I'm sure are listening today -- must feel a bond with the families in
other countries who have lost their fathers and mothers and brothers and sisters and sons
and daughters to terrorism.
(Page 65 of 83)
They understand the pain and the heartbreak and the suffering of the families whose
loved ones perished. The recent attacks are deadly reminders that the world's free nations
are at war. I also want to thank the courageous men and women in uniform all across the
globe who risk their lives so that all of us can live in freedom. This commission has an
important opportunity. Those in positions of responsibility in government are of necessity
focused on dozens of issues. This commission, however, can focus on one important topic,
get it right and provide insights that can be of great value to us. You've been asked to
try to connect the dots after the fact, to examine events leading up to September 11th and
to consider what lessons, if any, might be taken from that experience that could prevent
future dangers. It isn't an easy assignment. Yet the challenge facing our country before
September 11th, and still today, is even more difficult. Our task is to connect the dots
not after the fact but before the fact, to try to stop attacks before they happen. That
must be done without the benefit of hindsight, hearings, briefings or testimony.
RUMSFELD: Another attack on our people will be attempted. We can't know where, or when,
or by what technique. That reality drives those of us in government to ask the tough
questions: When and how might that attack be attempted and what will we need to have done,
today and every day before the attack, to prepare for it and to, if possible, to prevent
it? On September 11th, our world changed. It may be tempting to think that once the crisis
is passed that things will go back to the way they were. Not so. The world of September
10th is passed. We've entered a new security environment, arguably the most dangerous the
world has known. And if we're continue to live as free people, we cannot go back to
thinking the way the world thought on September 10th. For if we do, if we deal with the
problems of the 21st century through a 20th century prism, we will most certainly come to
the wrong conclusions and fail the American people. I saw the destruction terrorists
wreaked on September 11th. At the impact site, moments after the American Airlines Flight
77 hit the Pentagon, one could see the flames, smell the burning fuel, see the twisted
steel and the agony of victims. And once the crisis passed, I asked the question posed to
this commission: What, if anything, might have been done to prevent it?
First I must say, I knew of no intelligence during the six-plus months leading up to
September 11th that indicated terrorists would hijack commercial airliners, use them as
missiles to fly into the Pentagon or the World Trade Center towers. The president said
about forming what is today a 90-nation coalition to wage the global war on terrorist
networks. He promptly set U.S. and coalition forces -- air, sea and ground -- to attack
Afghanistan, to overthrow the Taliban regime and destroy that Al Qaida stronghold. In
short order, the Taliban regime was driven from power. Al Qaida's sanctuary in Afghanistan
was removed. Nearly two-thirds of their known leaders have been captured or killed. A
transitional government is in power and a clear message was sent: Terrorists who harbor
terrorists will pay a price. Those were bold steps. And today, in light of September 11th,
no one questions those actions. Today I suspect most would support a preemptive action to
deal with such a threat. Interestingly, the remarkable military successes in Afghanistan
is taken largely for granted, as is the achievement of bringing together a 90-nation
coalition. But imagine that we were back before September 11th and that a U.S. president
had looked at the information then available, gone before the Congress and the world and
said we need to invade Afghanistan and overthrow the Taliban and destroy the Al Qaida
terrorist network based on what little was known was known before September 11th.
RUMSFELD: How many countries would have joined? Many? Any? Not likely. We would have
heard objections to preemption similar to those voiced before the coalition launched
Operation Iraqi Freedom. We would have been asked, How could you attack Afghanistan when
it was Al Qaida that attacked us, not the Taliban? How can you go to war when countries in
the region don't support you? Won't launching such an invasion actually provoke terrorist
attacks against the United States? I agree with those who have testified here today --
Mrs. Albright, Secretary Cohen and others -- that unfortunately history shows that it can
take a tragedy like September 11th to waken the world to new threats and to the need for
action. We can't go back in time to stop the attack, but we all owe it to the families and
the loved ones who died on September 11th to assure that there loss will, in fact, be the
call that helps to ensure that thousands of other families do not suffer the pain they've
endured. President Bush came to office with a determination to prepare for the new threats
of the 21st century. The bombing of the Cole on October 12th, 2000, was seen both as
evidence of the Al Qaida threat and the need to adjust U.S. policy. The more one studies
terrorism, the more one becomes convinced that the approach to fighting it that had
evolved over several decades really wasn't working. Treating terrorism as a matter of
security, combating it through national and international law enforcement techniques and
taking defensive measures against terrorist against simply weren't enough. After the
attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, the first World Trade Center attack, the embassy
bombings in East Africa and the attack on the Cole, reasonable people have concluded that
the value of that approach had diminished. A more comprehensive approach required a review
not only of U.S. counterterrorism policy, but also U.S. policies with regard to other
countries, some of which have not previously been at the center of U.S. relations, as
Secretary Powell testified this morning. Dr. Rice has stated that she asked the National
Security Council staff in her first week in office for a new presidential initiative on Al
Qaida. In early March, the staff was directed to craft a more aggressive strategy aimed at
eliminating the Al Qaida threat. The first draft of that approach, in the form of a
presidential directive, was circulated by the NSC staff in June of 2001 and a number of
meetings were held that summer at the deputy secretary level to address the policy
questions involved, such as relating an aggressive strategy against Taliban to
U.S.-Pakistan relations. By the first week of September, the process had arrived at a
strategy that was presented to principals and later became NSPD-9, the president's first
major substantive national security decision directive. It was presented for a decision by
principals on September 4th, 2001, seven days before the 11th, and later signed by the
president, with minor changes and a preamble to reflect the events of September 11th, in
October.
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RUMSFELD: While this review of counterterrorism policy was under way, the Department of
Defense was developing a review of U.S. defense strategy. On February 2nd, less than two
weeks after taking office, I traveled to Germany for a conference on security policy.
Already we were focused on the problem of unconventional, or asymmetric, threats. On the
flight I was asked about the principles that would drive our defense review. I answered
that the 1991 Persian Gulf War had taught the world that taking on Western armies, navies
and air forces directly was not a good idea. It was, therefore, likely that potential
adversaries would look for so-called asymmetrical responses, everything from terrorism to
cyberattacks to information warfare, cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles to
longer-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction. I won't repeat the long list of
actions that Secretary Powell presented this morning in his excellent presentation. During
the last decade, the challenges facing the intelligence community have grown more complex.
Director Tenet will testify tomorrow and will provide a description of the challenges
facing the intelligence community. We were concerned about the risk of surprise. In June
of 2001, I attended the first NATO defense ministers meeting in the 21st century. I told
my colleagues about Vice President Cheney's appearance before the Senate for his
confirmation hearings as secretary of defense in March of 1989. During his hearings, a
wide range of security issues were discussed, but not one person uttered the word Iraq.
And yet within a year, Iraq had invaded Kuwait, and that word was in every headline. I
wondered what word might come to dominate my term in office that wasn't raised by members
of the Senate committee during my hearings. Three months later we learned the answer:
Afghanistan and Al Qaida. These were the kinds of threats that we were preparing to meet
and deal with in the months before September 11th, and during those early months we made
progress in the effort to transform for the error of surprise and unconventional threats.
Our actions included a congressionally required quadrennial defense review, completed just
days before the 9/11 attacks, where we laid out the transformation objectives of the
department, identified as our first priority the defense of U.S. territory against a broad
range of asymmetric threats, in short, homeland defense. We developed a concept for new
defense planning guidance and new contingency planning guidance. We found that many if not
most of the war plans that existed were in need of updating and that the process for
developing contingency plans was too lengthy. In May of 2001, we began the process of
streamlining the way the department prepares war plans, reducing the time to develop plans
and increasing the frequency at which the assumptions would be updated.
RUMSFELD: I should add that for much of that period, most of the senior officials
selected by the president had not been cleared or confirmed by the Senate. Nonetheless,
the few new civilians and the many civilian officials who stayed on to help and the
military leaders did a great deal of work. Indeed, because we were doing these things in
the department as well as in the National Security Council policy review, we were better
prepared to respond when the 9/11 attack came. The day of September 11th, the morning, I
was hosting a meeting for some members of Congress. And I remember stressing how important
it was for our country to be prepared for the unexpected. Shortly thereafter, someone
handed me a note saying a plane had hit one of the World Trade Center towers. Shortly
thereafter, I was in my office with a CIA briefer and I was told that a second plane had
hit the other tower. Shortly thereafter, at 9:38, the Pentagon shook with an explosion of
then unknown origin. I went outside to determine what had happened. I was not there long
because I was back in the Pentagon with a crisis action team shortly before or after 10:00
a.m. On my return from the crash site and before going to the executive support center, I
had one or more calls in my office, one of which was with the president. I went to the
National Military Command Center where General Myers, who was the vice chairman of the
chiefs at that time, had just returned from Capitol Hill. We discussed, and I recommended,
raising the defense condition level from five to three and the force protection level. I
joined the air threat telephone conference call that was already in progress. And one of
the first exchanges was with the vice president. He informed me of the president's
authorization to shoot down hostile aircraft coming to Washington D.C. My thoughts went to
the pilots of the military aircraft who might be called upon to execute such an order. It
was clear that they needed rules of engagement telling them what they could and could not
do. They needed clarity. There were standing rules of engagement, but not rules of
engagement that were appropriate for this first-time situation where civilian aircraft
were seized and being used as missiles to attack inside the United States. It may well be
the first time in history that U.S. armed forces in peacetime have been given the
authority to fire on fellow Americans going about their lawful business. We went to work
to refine the standing rules of engagement. I spent the remainder of the morning and the
afternoon participating in the air threat conference, talking to the president, the vice
president, General Myers and others and thinking about the way forward.
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RUMSFELD: During the course of the day, the president indicated he expected us to
provide him with robust options for military responses to that attack. In my first weeks
in office, I had prepared a list of guidelines to be weighed before committing U.S. forces
to combat, and I shared them with the president back in January or February of 2001. The
guidelines included a number of points, including one that -- if the proposed action truly
necessary, if lives are going to be put at risk, there must be a darn good reason, and
that all instruments of national power should be engaged before, during and after any use
of military force, and that it's important not to dumb down what's needed by promising not
to do things, for example, by saying we won't use ground forces. A few days after
September 11th, I wrote down some thoughts on terrorism and the new kind of war that had
been visited upon us. I noted it will take a sustained effort to root the terrorists out,
that the campaign is a marathon, not a sprint, that no terrorists are terrorist networks
such as Al Qaida is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruise missiles or bombers. The
coalitions that are being fashioned will not be fixed; rather, they'll change and evolve.
And it should not be surprising that some countries will be supportive of some activities
in which the U.S. is engaged, while other countries may not. And we can live with that.
And this is not a war against Islam. The Al Qaida terrorists are extremists whose views
are antithetical to those of most Muslims.
There are millions of Muslims around the world who we expect to become allies in this
struggle, unquote. In the following days, we prepared options to deal with the Taliban and
Afghanistan. And the president issued an ultimatum to the Taliban. When they failed to
comply, he initiated the global war on terror and directed the Department of Defense to
carry out Operation Enduring Freedom against the Al Qaida and their affiliates and the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan that harbored and supported them. This, of course, was a
Department of Defense where the armed forces of the United States had historically been
organized, trained and equipped to fight armies, navies and air forces, not to chase down
individual terrorists.
In the aftermath of September 11th, the department has pursued two tracks. We've
prosecuted the global war on terror in concert with our agencies of the government and our
coalition partners. In addition, we've continued -- we've had to continue, and, indeed,
accelerate the work to transform the department so that it has the ability to meet and
defeat the threats of the 21st century, different threats. There has been success on both
fronts. The coalition has been successful in overthrowing two terrorist regimes, hunted
down hundreds of terrorists and regime remnants, disrupted terrorist financing, disrupted
terrorist cells on several continents.
RUMSFELD: We've also established Northern Command, a new command dedicated to defending
the homeland. We have expanded the Special Operations Command in significant ways and
given them additional authorities, authorities they need today and will certainly need in
the future. We've established a new assistant secretary for homeland defense for the first
time and an undersecretary of defense for intelligence. The coalition's actions have sent
a message to the world's terrorist states that harboring terrorists and the pursuit of
weapons of mass murder carry with it unpleasant costs. By contrast, countries like Libya
that abandon the support of terrorism and the pursuit of those weapons can find an open
path to better relations with the world's free nations. In the period since September
11th, the administration, several committees of Congress and now this commission, have
been examining what happened on that day. A number of questions have been raised. Some
have asked: When the administration came into office, was there consideration of how to
deal with the USS Cole? It's a fair question. One concern was that launching another
cruise missile strike, months after the fact, might have sent a signal of weakness.
Instead, we implemented the recommendations of the Cole commission and began developing a
more comprehensive approach to deal with Al Qaida, resulting in NSPD-9. Some have asked:
Why wasn't bin Laden taken out? And if he had been hit, could it have prevented September
11th? I know of no actionable intelligence since January 20th that would have allowed the
U.S. to capture or kill bin Laden. It took 10 months to capture Saddam Hussein in Iraq,
and coalition forces had passed by the hole he was hiding in many, many times during those
months. They were able to find him only after someone with specific knowledge told us
precisely where he was. What that suggests, it seems to me, is that it's exceedingly
difficult to find a single individual who is determined not be found. Second, even if bin
Laden had been captured or killed in the weeks before September 11th, no one I know
believes that it would necessarily have prevented September 11th. Killing bin Laden would
not have removed Al Qaida's sanctuary in Afghanistan. Moreover, the sleeper cells that
flew the aircraft into the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon were already in the United
States months before the attack. Indeed, if actionable intelligence had appeared -- which
it did not -- 9/11 would likely still have happened. And ironically, much of the world
would likely have called the September 11th attack an Al Qaida retaliation for the U.S.
provocation of capturing or killing bin Laden. Some have asked whether there were plans to
go after Al Qaida in Afghanistan before 9/11, and if so, why weren't they successfully
implemented. I recently reviewed a briefing that I'm told was presented to me in early
February.
(Page 68 of 83)
RUMSFELD: I should add that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between
information that contributes to so-called national intelligence as opposed to information
that is necessary for military intelligence and focuses on the battlefield. I would say
that just as it would be unwise to concentrate everything under a single intelligence czar
in an effort to improve national intelligence, it would be equally undesirable to
concentrate everything under the Department of Defense so that one could improve military
intelligence. It seems to me that either would be an unfortunate approach. How can we wage
war not just on terrorist networks, but also on the ideology of hate that they spread? The
global war on terror will, in fact, be long. And I am convinced that victory in the war on
terror will require a positive effort as well as an aggressive battle. We need to find
creative ways to stop the next generation of terrorist from being recruited, trained and
deployed to kill innocent people. For every terrorist that coalition forces capture or
kill, still others are being recruited and trained. To win the war on terror, we have to
win the war of ideas: the battle for the minds of those who are being recruited and
financed by terrorist networks across the globe. Can we transform the nomination and
confirmation process so there are not long gaps with key positions unfilled every time
there is a new administration? As I have indicated, for most of the seven months leading
up to September 11th, the department's work was done without many of the senior officials
responsible for critical issues. We ought to consider whether in the 21st century we can
afford the luxury of taking so long to put in place the senior officials for national
security and try to fashion the necessary reforms for the clearance, nomination and
confirmation process. Another thought: Could our nation benefit from a Goldwater-
Nichols-like law for the executive branch of the U.S. government. If you think about it,
the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 1980s helped move Department of Defense towards a more
effective joint approach to war- fighting. It was a good thing. But to do so, each of the
services had to give up some of their turf, some of their authority. And today one could
argue that the interagency process is such that the executive branch is stovepiped much
like the four services were 20 years ago. And ask the question: Could we usefully apply
that concept of the Goldwater-Nichols law to the government as a whole? Let me conclude by
saying that despite the work of the coalition, terrorist attacks continue, most recently
in Madrid. It's almost certain that in the period ahead, somewhere more terrorist attacks
will be attempted.
RUMSFELD: What can be done? Not long ago, we marked the 20th anniversary of a terrorist
attack in Beirut, Lebanon, when the suicide bomb truck attacked the Marine barracks. And
that blast killed more than 240 Americans. Soon after that attack, President Reagan and
Secretary of State Shultz asked me to serve as the Middle East envoy for a period. That
experience taught me lessons about the nature of terrorism that are relevant today as we
prosecute the global war on terror. After the attack, one seemingly logical response was
to put a cement barricade around the buildings to prevent more truck bombings -- a very
logical thing to do. And it had the effect of preventing more truck bombings. But the
terrorists very quickly figured out how to get around those barricades, and they began
lobbing rocket-propelled grenades over the cement barricades. And the reaction then was to
hunker down even more, and they started seeing buildings along the Cornish that runs along
the sea in Beirut draped with metal wire mesh coming down from several stories high so
that when rocket-propelled grenades hit the mesh, they would bounce off, doing little
damage. It worked, again, but only briefly. And the terrorists again adapted. They watched
the comings and goings of embassy personnel and began hitting soft targets. They killed
people on their way to and from work. So for every defense, first barricades then wire
mesh, the terrorists moved to another avenue of attack. One has to note that the
terrorists had learned important lessons: that terrorism is a great equalizer, it's a
force multiplier, it's cheap, it's deniable, it yields substantial results, it's low risk
and it's often without penalty. They had learned that a single attack by influencing
public opinion and morale can alter the behavior of great nations. Moreover, I said that
free people had learned lessons as well: that terrorism is a form of warfare that must be
treated as such. Simply standing in a defensive position, absorbing blows is not enough.
It has to be attacked, and it has to be deterred. That was 20 years ago.
(Page 69 of 83)
When our nation was attacked on September 11th, the president recognized what had
happened as an act of war and that it must be treated as such -- not a law enforcement
matter. He knew that weakness would only invite aggression, and that the only way to
defeat terrorists was to take the war to them and to make clear to states that sponsor and
harbor them that such actions would have consequences. That's why we have forces risking
their lives fighting terrorists today. And to live as free people in the 21st century, we
cannot think that we can hide behind concrete barriers or wire mesh. We cannot think that
acquiesce or trying to make a separate peace with terrorists to leave us alone, but to go
after our friends, will work. Free people cannot live in fear and remain free.
RUMSFELD: I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
KEAN: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. Questioning will be led by Commissioner
Kerrey, followed by Commissioner Gorton.
KERREY: Well, Mr. Secretary, very good to see you again. You're still a terrific
witness. My favorite witness ever.
RUMSFELD: Thank you.
KERREY: First of all, I'd like to know how many cars it took to get all of you guys
over here? (LAUGHTER) It's a big group. Let me just read back to you what you said 20
years ago, Mr. Secretary, that simply standing in a defensive position absorbing blows is
not enough, that terrorism must be deterred. And I say with great respect, it seems to me,
up to 11 September, we were standing in a defensive position, taking blows. I mean, I'm
going to give you the same line that I gave former Secretary Cohen when he was here
earlier.
RUMSFELD: And I'm going to give you the same answers. I thought he did a good job.
(LAUGHTER)
KERREY: All right. Well, we'll see if they are the same answers. I mean, this was -- it
wasn't just that we were attacked on the 11th of September, Mr. Secretary. It's the same
group of people that hit the Cole on the 12th of October. Same group of people that tried
to hit The Sullivans a few months before that. The same group of people that were
responsible for millennium attacks that we had interrupted, and in Jordan. The same group
of people that hit our East African embassy bombings on the 7th of August. And now we know
believe the same group of people that were responsible for other attacks against the
United States. This was an army led by Osama bin Laden who declared war on us on the 23rd
of February, 1998. And we had all kinds of reasons, I've heard them all, and they're all
wonderful, as to why the only military attack we had was a single attack on the 20th of
August, 1998, and other than that there wasn't anything. And 19 men, as a consequence,
defeated us utterly, with less than a half million dollars. I ask you, wouldn't a
declaration of war, either by President Clinton or President Bush prior to that, not just
to go after bin Laden, but to say to the DOD, CIA and other agencies, you've got to work
together, you've got to put together a terrorist list of radical Islamists that we believe
are connected to these things to prevent from coming into the United States of America.
You've got to make sure you consider all options and possibilities that might be used
against us. You said you received no specific intelligence about the possibility of a
plane being used as a bomb. Mr. Secretary, you're well-known as somebody who thinks about
all kinds of terrible possibilities that might happen that nobody else is thinking about.
I mean, that's what you do so well when you're going into a difficult situation. I mean,
it seems to me that a declaration of war, either by President Clinton or by President
Bush, prior to 9/11 would have mobilized the government in a way that at least would have
reduced substantially the possibility that 9/11 would have happened. Do you agree or not?
That's a different question than I gave Secretary Cohen. I'm getting better at this.
RUMSFELD: It is. I was going to use his answer and now I can't. Possibly, let me put it
that way. The problem with it -- it sounds good the way you said it. I try to put myself
in other people's shoes. And try to put yourself in the shoes of a new administration that
had just arrived. And time had passed. We were in the process of bringing people on board.
And the president said he wanted a new policy for counterterrorism. Making a declaration
of war in February or March or April, for the sake of argument, without having fashioned
the policy to follow it up, which they were working on, without having taken the kinds of
steps in the Department of Defense to review contingency plans and get them up to date and
get the assumptions current for the 21st century, without having tried to strengthen the
Special Operations Forces, it seems to me might have been a bold stroke that would have
sounded good. But when not followed up with the kind of capabilities that we were able to
follow it up with on October 7th, when we put forces and capabilities into Afghanistan,
might -- so it might not have been a great idea. I don't think it would have stopped
September 11th.
(Page 70 of 83)
KERREY: Let me put it this way to you. Let's say that the Federal Aviation
Administration had heeded some warnings about the possibility of a hijacking and had
altered the procedures in American airports to prevented these hijackers from being able
to get on the planes in the first place; or had different procedures on the airports on
the morning of 11th of September to make certain the pilots were locked up front and that
the passengers didn't remained in their seats and cooperate.
(APPLAUSE) Let's say that 9/11 hadn't happened. Would you have gone to the American
people and carried out the strategy that you say you worked on all year long and came up
with on the 4th of September? Because the president had to go to the American people and
said, we're going to work to eliminate the Al Qaida network, we're going to use all
national elements of the power to do so, diplomatic, military, economic, intel,
information, law enforcement.
KERREY: And we're going to eliminate sanctions for Al Qaida and related terrorist
networks. And if diplomatic efforts fail to do so, we're going to consider additional
measures. Earlier in your testimony, you said all the reasons why to do such a thing would
provoke angry response. Would the administration have put this policy in place were it not
for 9/11?
RUMSFELD: I believe we would have. One can't announce that for certainty, because 9/11
happened. But it had been worked on, developed and was ready to go into place.
KERREY: Well, then doesn't...
RUMSFELD: In June and July when the intelligence spike took place, there were a good
number of steps that were taken. My responsibilities, as you know, were overseas and not
domestically. But forces were alerted. Embassies were alerted, as Secretary Powell
indicated today. There were a number of steps taken by the Transportation Department with
respect to airlines and cautions and warnings there. So it's not as though the
intelligence that was gathering had not been understood and address and a great number of
steps in addition to the development of the policy taken.
KERREY: I've got to say, Mr. Secretary, if that's the case -- and I trust you, I
believe you on this point -- then I don't think it's a good argument to say that the
American people wouldn't have accepted something prior to 9/11 that was unpopular, because
you just said that absent 9/11 you would have recommended to the president to put in place
a policy that would have been exceptionally unpopular and difficult to sell. I believe he
should have, by the way, regardless of whether or not 9/11 happened. But it doesn't work.
The argument falls on its face if you say, Please understand, we couldn't have done this
before 9/11, if you say you would have done it absent 9/11.
RUMSFELD: I understand.
KERREY: All right. Dr. Rice has said that the national security team was briefed on the
threat of Al Qaida in the transition and that it was well understood. This is what she
said in The Washington Post yesterday: It was well understood by the president and his
national security team, the principle.
In the interview that we did with you, you seemed not to be as clear as Dr. Rice was,
or at least Secretary Powell was. And by the way, I'm very sympathetic to that given that
the Department of Defense did not have that kind of authority over counterterrorism
activity. So perhaps that would be the reason you were not. But in the interview, you
indicated that you didn't recall that briefing. And in your testimony you also referenced
-- I love to hear that even you have moments that you forget, you were at a briefing and
people were telling you something. Do you recall the briefings on Al Qaida by Secretary
Cohen and...
RUMSFELD: Secretary Cohen commented on it today. We did have a one or two meetings. He
had a long list of items. There must have been 40- or 50-plus items.
RUMSFELD: I have given it to the committee. The first item was one that concerned him
the most. And it involved a sensitive item that was very much on his mind that was
terrorism-related, but to my recollection not Al-Qaida-related.
KERREY: It seems to me that Dr. Rice is overstating the case a bit in that statement
saying that the threat of Al Qaida was well understood by the president and his entire
national security team.
RUMSFELD: Oh, I don't think that's an overstatement.
KERREY: No?
RUMSFELD: Certainly the people in the administration who came in didn't arrive out of
cellophane packages. They...
KERREY: But you didn't get a briefing by the counterterrorist and security group nor by
SOLIC?
RUMSFELD: I did not get a briefing that Secretary Powell got, no. I was briefed by
members of the joint staff and other people in the policy departments of the Department of
Defense.
(Page 71 of 83)
KERREY: Dr. Rice also said that she wasn't satisfied with the off-the-shelf military
response options that were available after the Cole, the so-called tit-for-tat options
that I think she was referring to 20 August 1998 against the camps in Afghanistan. Did she
ask for military options? Or were there military options requested during your term,
because our investigation shows that there were no new military plans developed against Al
Qaida or bin Laden prior to September 11th?
RUMSFELD: I think it's accurate to say -- General Myers, you may want to chime in here.
But I think it's accurate to say that there were military options. And I characterize it
as options and not a comprehensive plan to deal with Al Qaida and countries that harbor Al
Qaida, but options to react -- response options, military response options to deal with
specific terrorist events. And I was briefed on them, as I indicated in my testimony. And
I suspect that Dr. Rice was briefed on them. I can just say that I don't remember ever
seeing, in the first instance, I don't remember anyone being briefed on military proposals
to react to something where they were fully satisfied. Nor do I ever remember military
people being fully satisfied with the intelligence available. That's the nature of the
world we live in. Dick, do you want to comment?
MYERS: Well, I would just add that we did, after the Cole, continue some of the
planning that had gone on before, since '98 actually, and developed some additional
options. I think we briefed the committee on those, or at least the staff.
(CROSSTALK)
KERREY: I'm confused when the national security adviser, in the Post, says that we
didn't have an Al Qaida plan. No plan was given to the new administration on how to deal
with Al Qaida. And then she goes on to say that was not satisfied with the off- the-shelf
options that were available. Especially in the second case, we don't see any evidence that
during the Bush administration there were any new requests that came to DOD asking for new
military options. If there was dissatisfaction with the national security adviser, you
would think she would have sent a request over for alternative military options.
RUMSFELD: Well, first of all, my recollection is that Sandy Berger has agreed with Dr.
Rice that a plan for the Al Qaida was not handed from one administration to the other. And
second, my understand is that the joint staff, after I was briefed and asked a lot of
questions, went back down and continued working on those response plans throughout that
period, and that that was one of the reasons why we were in a position to respond so
promptly after September 11th.
KERREY: Is that true?
MYERS: That's correct.
KERREY: I said to Secretary Powell earlier, but I'll say it to you as well, Mr.
Secretary. I don't understand this We're waiting for a plan thing at all. I really don't.
I mean, we're dealing with an individual who's led a military effort against the United
States for 10 years and has serially killed a significant number of Americans over that
period of time. Why in God's name have I got to wait eight months to get a plan? I mean,
I'm very sympathetic to the problems that you've mention. Paul wasn't on board I guess
till March. And your last appointment, I think you had in your testimony, wasn't there,
your key appointment wasn't there until August or something like that. I'm very
sympathetic to all the difficulties of transition. But I still get in my head: Why do we
need a brand new military, a full- blown plan like we're building a house or something
here?
RUMSFELD: Well, let me just make one comment and maybe someone else would like to
respond. Afghanistan was harboring the Al Qaida. Afghanistan was something like 8,000
miles from the United States. It was surrounded by countries that were not particularly
friendly to the United States of America. Afghanistan, as I said publicly on one occasion,
didn't have a lot of targets. I mean, you can go from an overhead and attack Afghanistan,
and in a very short order, you run out of targets that are lucrative. You can pound the
rubble in Al Qaida training camps 15 times and not do much damage. They can put tents
right back up.
(Page 72 of 83)
RUMSFELD: The country has suffered for decades in drought, in civil war, in occupation
by the Soviet Union. And trying to deal with them from the air, in my view -- and that is
essentially what the courses of action were that I saw...
KERREY: I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. But you said earlier that even absent 9/11
your strategy would have been to eliminate the Al Qaida network, to use all elements of
national power to do so, to eliminate the sanctuaries for Al Qaida and related terrorist
networks. I appreciate that. Is it a tough mission? Yes. But your declaratory earlier was
that you would carried that out even absent 9/11.
RUMSFELD: And I would say that that's one of the reasons that Secretary Powell and I
and others in the department, in the government spent time connecting with countries in
that part of the world in ways that were unusual and distinctly different than had been
the case previously, from the very first day of the administration.
KERREY: My time's up. Off to Senator Gorton.
KEAN: Senator Gorton?
GORTON: Mr. Secretary, on page 10 of your written statement, you express what I think
is justified frustration in the extended period of time it took you to get a team in place
with which to make these decisions. You list nine of your senior staff, the earliest of
whom was confirmed on the 3rd of May 2001, and the last of whom, interestingly enough, an
assistant secretary for international security policy, not until August 6th. And you say
that the confirmation system -- that kind of confirmation system and those delays just
don't work in the 21st century. I can greatly sympathize with you on that, but you leave
out one very important factor. When were those nine people nominated and actually sent to
the Senate?
RUMSFELD: Well, I wasn't suggesting in this that I -- in fact, I hope I phrased it more
elegantly than you did. (LAUGHTER) My point here, I hope -- my point, whether I made it
well or not, my point is, not simply the Senate confirmation, but the clearance process,
the entire process, finding them, putting them through the FBI, putting them through
multiple ethics. It took weeks for people to fill out their ethics forms. It cost a
fortune for some people to fill out their ethics form. Then you have to go from the one in
the executive branch to the one in the United States Senate and have that filled out in
different forms.
RUMSFELD: Some of you may have been through this. It's an amazing process. And then
some guy walks in and gives you a drug test. (LAUGHTER) It is not just the Senate,
although the Senate can be a problem, with all respect. (LAUGHTER)
GORTON: Thank you. Thank you for that clarification. So in your view, it's the whole
process.
RUMSFELD: Entirely, yes.
GORTON: From a new administration finding who they want, getting them through various
clearances and then the Senate. But we don't know here how long the Senate part of that
took in any one of these cases.
RUMSFELD: Well, I know. And I could give it to you if you're interested.
GORTON: I think I would be interested.
RUMSFELD: Well, we tried to parse it out to see how long each piece took. And the
Senate is just a part of it.
GORTON: Thank you. On page 16 of your statement, and you've referred to this in
connection with Senator Kerrey's questions, you ask and answer the question with respect
to why nothing was done with respect to the attack on the Cole in the Bush administration.
And you say, In fact, to do it four months later might have then sent a signal of
weakness. Now, were the reasons for no specific response to the Cole, one, that you were
still uncertain about who was responsible to it; two, that by the time you were in office,
say in February of 2002, it was simply too late to respond specifically to an incident
that had taken place the previous October; or three, that there just wasn't anything to
shoot at?
RUMSFELD: Let me respond this way: First of all, it was seven and a half months.
Someone earlier had specified that it was all year, which is not really the case. It was
7.5 months between the day the president was sworn in and the day of September 11th, 7.75
months, for the sake of precision. You say nothing was done. A great deal was done. The
Cole commission did a good job. They made a whole series of recommendations and the
Department of Defense implemented those recommendations. In my view, that is not nothing.
You're right, as the time passed, two things were happening. Time was passing since the
event of the Cole attack where 17 Americans and military personnel were killed. Time
passed, and we became farther and farther away from that event.
(Page 73 of 83)
RUMSFELD: And the other thing that was happening is that the policy was being developed
to deal with Al Qaida and the country that was harboring them. Last, and as you got closer
to that, and you got farther away from the Cole event, it became logical, it seems to me,
to look more toward the comprehensive approach than some sort of a repeat of what had
happened after the embassy bombings or after some of the earlier events which, without
criticizing the responses that took place then, the fact that they -- that had been all
there was led us, me, I should say, to feel very deeply that the president ought not to
simply fire off cruise missiles, that in the event he was going to make a response, he had
to put people on the ground; he had to put people at risk; he had to show a seriousness of
purpose or the administration would be seen as a continuum from the lobbying cruise
missiles after an attack with relatively modest effect.
GORTON: Your statement, both oral and written in following up on that is quite
impressive with respect to the preparation for a broader policy that took place in the
seven months prior to 9/11. And on September 4th, there was a fairly definitive
recommendation which you say would almost certainly have been adopted even in the absence
of 9/11.
RUMSFELD: No, I think I said that I would have favored adopting it. I don't want to
prejudge what would have happened.
GORTON: All right. I'll modify the question of that point. That program, as we
understand it, had three parts. First, there would be one more diplomatic attempt with the
Taliban to see if they would give up Osama bin Laden. Second, we would begin to arm the
Northern Alliance and various tribes in Afghanistan to stir up trouble there and hope that
perhaps they could capture Osama bin Laden. And third, if those didn't work, there would
be a military response that would be substantial, much more than, you know, lobbying
cruise missiles into the desert. But as we understand it, this was seen as a three-year
program, if we had to go to the third stage. My question is, given World Trade Center one,
given the embassy bombings, given the millennium plot, given the Cole, given the
declaration of war by Osama bin Laden, what made you think that we had the luxury of that
much time?
GORTON: Even seven months, much less three years, before we could cure this particular
problem.
RUMSFELD: Well, let me answer two ways. Number one, I didn't come up with the three
years. I tend to scrupulously avoid predicting that I am smart enough to know how long
something's going to take because I know I don't know. Where that number came from, I
don't know. In fact, dealing with the terrorism threat is going to take a lot longer than
three years. And in fact, dealing with the Afghanistan piece of it took a lot less, as you
point out. It seems to me that the -- it's interesting that you cite that because in fact,
the president and Secretary Powell made an attempt early on, one last try, to separate the
Taliban from the Al Qaida, and it failed. Not surprisingly, they'd been rather stiff. But
it failed flat.
GORTON: It even failed after 9/11, didn't it?
RUMSFELD: That's my point. After 9/11 it failed flat. And the other concern we had was
that we had precious little information about the groups in Afghanistan. We had enough
information that there were people knowledgeable who were concerned that if all we did was
help the Northern Alliance, as opposed to some other elements in the country, we may end
up being quite unsuccessful, and that the goal was to try to get a broader base of support
in the country. And that took some time. And the part you left out was that we decided, I
decided, the president decided, everyone decided quite early that we had to put U.S.
forces in that country. And that was not a part of that plan. That was something that came
along after September 11th. GORTON: Well, Mr. Secretary, that's a good answer. But it
isn't an answer to the question that I asked you.
RUMSFELD: My question is I don't know...
GORTON: The question...
RUMSFELD: The three years, I just don't know.
(Page 74 of 83)
GORTON: The question that I asked you was: What made you think even when you took over
and got these first briefings, given the history of Al Qaida and its successful attacks on
Americans that we had the luxury of even seven months before we could make any kind of
response, much less three years?
RUMSFELD: And my answer was on point. I said I didn't come up with three years, and I
can't defend that number.
RUMSFELD: I don't know where that came from. With respect to seven months, I've
answered. My testimony today lays out what was done during that period. Do you have -- you
phrase it, do you have the luxury of seven months? In reflecting on what happened on
September 11th, the question is, obviously, the Good Lord willing, things would have
happened prior to that that could have stopped it. But something to have stopped that
would have had to happen months and months and months beforehand, not five minutes or not
one month or two months or three months. And the counter argument, it seems to me, is do
you have the luxury of doing what was done before and simply just heaving some cruise
missiles into the thing and not doing it right? I don't know. We thought not. It's a
judgment.
GORTON: Let me ask you the same question that I asked of Senator Powell. At one level,
you could claim, but you're too modest and too cautious to claim, that your policies since
9/11 have been successful, that is to say there has not been another successful terrorist
attack, you know, on -- you know, on the United States. We all know, as Senator Powell
pointed out, that that risk is still there, and it's going to be there for as long as any
of us can imagine. But none the less, we've now gone two and a half years without any such
attack. What do you think or how do you evaluate our provisional success in that
connection? How much of it is just luck? How much of it is hardened targets, the steps
we've taken for homeland security? How much of it is more effective intelligence and that
prevention, both through your department and elsewhere? How much of it is due to the fact
that we've attacked the source and to a large extent in Afghanistan at least eliminated
it? Give me your own views as to what you think we've done right, and the importance of
those things that we've done right. And how much have we ended or reduced the amount of
terrorism in the world itself?
GORTON: And how much have we just displaced it and caused it to take place in other
places?
RUMSFELD: As a former pilot, one of the things you always did was you never talked
about the fact there hadn't been a flight accident for a long time.
GORTON: That's true.
RUMSFELD: And with good reason. You start doing that and something happens. The fact
is, a terrorist can attack any time, any place, using any technique. And we can't defend
everywhere at every moment against every technique. And we could have a terrorist attack
anywhere in the world tomorrow. And we have to recognize that. This is a tough business
that we're in. And it is difficult, and it's challenging. Now, to the good side. A
90-nation coalition is a big thing, the fact that all of those countries are cooperating,
sharing intelligence, helping to find bank accounts, helping to put pressure on terrorists
coming across their borders, helping to put pressure on things moving across their
borders. Is it perfect? No. Are things still porous? Yes. Is money still getting there?
Yes. But everything is harder. Everything is more difficult to day. It's tougher to
recruit. It's tougher to train. It's tougher to retain. It's tougher to finance. It's
tougher to move things. It's tougher to communicate with each other for those folks.
Someone asked me if Osama bin Laden is masterminding all of this. And I said, you know,
who knows. But if I were in his shoes, I think I'd be spending an awful lot of time trying
to not get caught. Most of his time's probably spent trying not to get caught. And so he
is busy, and that's a good thing. And there has been a lot of pressure. How to put a value
on that, I don't know. What worries me is the last point I mentioned in my prepared
remarks and that was this issue of: How many people are coming in the intake? How many
people are being trained to go out and kill innocent men, women and children? We've got a
lot of good things going on, capturing and killing and putting pressure on terrorists
today. And every day that cooperation within our government and between 90 nations gets
better and better and better. The intelligence fusion cells that are taking place, the
cooperative arrangements between the United States and other militaries, the cooperative
arrangements between the Department of Defense and the CIA, every day they get better. But
at the same time, we know of certain knowledge that money is going to madrassas schools
that are training people to kill people. And that's a problem.
GORTON: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
KEAN: Commissioner Ben-Veniste?
BEN-VENISTE: Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary. There are a number of different questions
I'd like to ask, but my time is limited. I'd
like to first mention something that Commissioner Gorton brought up, and that is the
question of transition.
(Page 75 of 83)
BEN-VENISTE: And I think this commission ought to have a recommendation, particularly
with respect to the intelligence community and those Cabinet agencies that are charged
with protecting the safety of the United States in terms of the way the transition takes
place. It seems as though things are done on the fly. People have other objectives. They
have many things to do coming in. It appears, from what we have heard, that the
administration officials leaving government in the Clinton administration, they were
willing to be generous with their time, but they didn't always connect up with the right
people, it seems. And I think we ought to have a recommendation with respect to
institutionalizing transition in these times which require immediate response to issues. I
want to focus on two things, I guess. One, I'm astounded that this past week, a week ago,
we saw on television a videotape of the Predator. Now, the Predator, we were told, was of
such a high security classification that the classification itself was secret. We couldn't
even mention the name of the classification. And I just don't understand how a videotape
of the Predator comes into the public access in that way. I just make that as a
commentary. With respect to your comment about domestic intelligence and what we knew as
of September 10th, 2001, your statement was that you knew of no intelligence to suggest
that planes would be hijacked in the United States and flown into buildings. Well, it is
correct that the United States intelligence community had a great deal of intelligence
suggesting that the terrorists, back since 1994, had plans, discussed plans, to use
airplanes as weapons, loaded with fuel, loaded with bombs, loaded with explosives. The
Algerians had a plan in '94 to fly a plane into the Eiffel Tower.
BEN-VENISTE: The Bojinka plot in '95 discussed flying an explosive-laden small plane
into CIA headquarters. Certainly CIA was well aware of that. There were plans in '97 using
a UAV. In '98, an Al Qaida- connected group talked about flying a commercial plane into
the World Trade Center. In '98, there was a plot broken up by Turkish intelligence
involving the use of a plane as a weapon. In '99, there was a plot involving exploding a
plane at an airport. Also in '99, there was a plot regarding an explosive-laden
hang-glider. In '99 or in 2000, there was a plot regarding hijacking a 747. And in August
of 2001, there was information received by our intelligence community regarding flying a
plane into the Nairobi embassy, our Nairobi embassy. And so I suggest that when you have
this threat spike in the summer of 2001 that said something huge was going to happen and
the FAA circulates, as you mentioned, a warning which does nothing to alert people on the
ground to the potential threat of jihadist hijacking, which only, it seems to me, despite
the fact that they read into the congressional record the potential for a hijacking threat
in the United States, in the summer of 2001, it never gets to any actionable level. Nobody
at the airports is alerted to any particular threat. Nobody flying the planes takes action
of a defensive posture. I understand that going after Al Qaida overseas is one thing. But
protecting the United States is another thing. And it seems to me that a statement that we
could not conceive of such a thing happening really does not reflect the state of our
intelligence community as of 2001, sir.
RUMSFELD: A couple of comments. I quite agree with you, there were a number of reports
about potential hijacking. I even remember comments about UAVs.
(Page 76 of 83)
RUMSFELD: I even have seen things about private aircraft hitting something. But I do
not recall ever seeing anything in the period since I came back to government about the
idea of taking a commercial airliner and using it as a missile. I just don't recall seeing
it. And maybe you do, Dick?
MYERS: No, I do not.
BEN-VENISTE: Well, the fact is that our staff has -- and the joint inquiry before us, I
must say -- has come up with eight or 10 examples which are well-known in the intelligence
community. My goodness, there was an example of an individual who flew a small plane and
landed right next to the White House.
RUMSFELD: I remember.
BEN-VENISTE: Crash landed that. The CIA knew that there was a plot to fly an
explosive-laden plane into CIA headquarters. So we do, within our intelligence community,
have very much in mind the fact that this is a potential technique. You put that together
with the fact that there is a heightened threat level. People like Director Tenet, people
like Richard Clarke, are running around, as they say, with their hair on fire, in the
summer of 2001, knowing something big is going to happen. And yet everybody is looking
overseas.
RUMSFELD: And I made two comments on that. One, the spike in that summer, you're
correct. There was a good deal of concern about it. And you suggested that warnings did
not go out. My recollection is a lot of warnings did go out. Now, I have nothing to do
with warnings inside the United States. We had to deal with warnings of force protection
ex-U.S. And the State Department, Colin testified to that this morning, that the State
Department had a whole lot of alerts. So there was attention to that. The second thing I
would say is, the -- how to put this -- in three years, since I've been back in the
Pentagon, there have been people running around with their hair on fire a lot of times. It
isn't like it's once or twice or thrice. We are seeing so much intelligence, so much
information that is of deep concern, that we have scrambled airplanes. We have sent ships
to sea to protect them. We have gone up to a high level of alert on a number of occasions
because of these types of spikes in intel activity. In most instances when something does
not follow, maybe because we went to high alert, maybe because they go to school on us.
BEN-VENISTE: Let me just follow it up briefly to say that we knew that terrorists had
attacked us in '93 at the World Trade Center.
BEN-VENISTE: We knew in the millennium plot in December of '99 that Al Qaida had an
operative sleeper in the United States, or coming to the United States, who planned to
blow up LAX. That was interdicted. They were on high alert during the millennium plot, and
they thought about domestic terrorism in that regard. And now, as we get into 2001, it
just seems to me like we're looking at the white truck that had everyone captivated during
the hunt for the sniper. Everybody was looking in the wrong direction. Why weren't people
thinking about protecting the United States? We knew that there were two Al Qaida
operatives in the United States. And yet that information does not get circulated. It
doesn't get to the people at the airports. It doesn't go on Most Wanted on television
where people could identify such individuals. We know that a man named Moussaoui has been
identified as somebody who took lessons on just how to steer an airplane, not how to take
it off, not how to land it, just how to steer it. So it seems to me when you make the
statement, sir, that we didn't know that planes might be used as weapons in the summer of
2001, I just have to take issue with that.
RUMSFELD: Well, I didn't say we didn't know. I said I didn't know. And if I just was
handed a civil aviation circular that people did know. And they sent it out on June 22nd,
2001.
BEN-VENISTE: They sent it out. But nobody did a thing about it. Nobody got anybody at
our borders to identify individuals who might be suspect, to give them greater scrutiny.
RUMSFELD: Well, may I...
BEN-VENISTE: Somebody was found simply through the good works of a Customs agent who
used his native intelligence and picked up probably the 20th hijacker in that way.
(Page 77 of 83)
RUMSFELD: Let me put something into some context. The Department of Defense, as Senator
Kerrey has indicated earlier, did not have responsibility for the borders. It did not have
responsibility for the airports.
BEN-VENISTE: I understand that.
RUMSFELD: And the fact that I might not have known something ought not to be considered
unusual. Our task was to be oriented out of this country... BEN-VENISTE: I understand
that.
RUMSFELD: ... and to defend against attacks from abroad. And a civilian aircraft was a
law enforcement matter to be handled by law enforcement authorities and aviation
authorities. And that is the way our government was organized and arranged. So those
questions you're posing are good ones. And they are valid, and they ought to be asked. But
they ought to be asked of people who had the statutory responsibility for those things.
And it seems to me that you've had that opportunity.
BEN-VENISTE: The only reason I put them to you, sir, was because of your comment in
your opening statement.
RUMSFELD: Right. I was confessing ignorance. KEAN: Thank you very much, Commissioner.
All right, Commissioner Gorelick?
GORELICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Secretary and your colleagues for
being here today and for sharing your thoughts with us.
GORELICK: I'd like to start where Commissioner Ben-Veniste left off in his dialogue
with you. If one looks at the PDDs and the SEIBs that were available to you personally. If
all you do...
RUMSFELD: What's a SEIB?
GORELICK: I'm sorry. It's the senior executive intelligence brief. So these are the
daily briefings that go to people at your level and just below you. If you look at the
headlines, only the headlines of those in the period that has come to be known as the
summer of threat, it would set your hair on fire, not just George Tenet's hair on fire. I
don't think it is fair to compare what all of the intelligence experts have said was an
extraordinary spike that plateaued at a spiked level for months with spikes that happen,
come and go and are routine. You were right... (CROSSTALK)
RUMSFELD: ... the PDD and shared that concern.
GORELICK: Pardon me?
RUMSFELD: I was seeing the PDD each morning and shared that concern. GORELICK: Well, I
expect that you would. So now I would like to talk about the aspects that were in your
control. I had a conversation with Secretary Wolfowitz's -- one of his predecessors, when
the 1996 Olympics were being planned about what do we do when an aircraft is being
hijacked and is flying into a stadium at the Olympics? What is the military's response?
What is it's role? And it has always been my assumption that even though, yes, you were
looking out, that you have a responsibility to protect our airspace. So my question is: In
this summer of threat, what did you do to protect, let's just say the Pentagon, from
attack? Where were our aircraft when a missile is heading toward the Pentagon? Surely that
is within the Pentagon's responsibility to protect -- force protection, to protect our
facilities, to protect something -- our headquarters, the Pentagon. Is there anything that
we did at the Pentagon to prevent that harm in the spring and summer of '01?
RUMSFELD: First let me respond as to what the responsibility of the Department of
Defense has been with a hijacking. As I said, it was a law enforcement issue. And the
Department of Defense has had various understandings with FAA whereby when someone squawks
hijack, they have an arrangement with the Department of Defense that the military would
send an airplane up and monitor the flight, but certainly in a hijack situation, did not
have authority to shoot down a plane that was being hijacked. The purpose of a hijack is
to take the plane from one place to another place where it wasn't intended to be going,
not to fly it into buildings.
RUMSFELD: Second, with respect to the defense of the Pentagon, you're quite right. The
force protection responsibilities do fall on the military. And just to put it right up on
the table, we're in the flight pattern for National Airport. There's a plane that goes by,
you know, how many yards from my window, 50 times a day. I don't know how far it is. But
anyone who's been in that office has heard it roar right by the window. There isn't any
way to deal with that at all. And force protection tends to be force protection from the
ground. Dick, do you want to comment? MYERS: I would just say that since the Cold War, the
focus of North American Aerospace Defense Command was outward; it was not inward. The
hijacking agreement with the FAA was as the secretary described it. It would be a call and
a response to the hijack, but certainly not with the thought of shooting it down. It was
to monitor, try to get it to follow instructions and then follow it to its ultimate
destination, if we could.
(Page 78 of 83)
GORELICK: That is consistent with the story that we have been told throughout the
military. I would just say that, to me, again, you know, 20/20 hindsight is perfect. But
if I were sitting at the Pentagon and seeing the kind of threats that were coming in that
summer, I would say to myself, Is business as usual appropriate? I mean, the question I
have is whether you thought to say: Should we have defenses pre-positioned in a way that
we don't? We know that our forces that our aircraft from NORAD came too late to the
Pentagon.
MYERS: Sure, we changed our whole air defense posture at the end of the Cold War. We
went from about 22 sites to down about 7, I believe, between the U.S. and Canada,
purposely and at direction of senior leadership. Let me just mention one other thing. The
threat spike that I remember and that I recall from that summer of '01 were -- and the
things that I was reading -- and I was the vice chairman then so I might not have gotten
all of the PDDs, but I think I probably saw the intelligence eventually -- were external
to the United States. That's where the threat was, and that's where we took action. And we
sortied ships, we changed force protection conditions, particularly in Central Command,
but other places around the world based on that intelligence. But I don't remember reading
those documents to an internal threat.
RUMSFELD: And it certainly was not business as usual. When we saw those threats, a
whole host of steps were taken by way of force protection.
GORELICK: May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman? We can't go into the content of
the PDDs and the SEIBs here. And I can't even characterize them in order to ask you the
next question that I would ask. So let me ask you this: Was it your understanding that the
NORAD pilots who were circling over Washington D.C. that morning had indeed received a
shoot-down order?
RUMSFELD: When I arrived in the command center, one of the first things I heard, and I
was with you, was that the order had been given and that the pilots -- correction, not the
pilots necessarily, but the command had been given the instructions that their pilots
could, in fact, use their weapons to shoot down a commercial airliners filled with our
people in the event that the aircraft appeared to be behaving in a threatening way and an
unresponsive way.
GORELICK: Now, you make a distinction there between the command and the pilots. Was it
your understanding that the pilots had received that order?
RUMSFELD: I'm trying to get in time because...
MYERS: Well, I think -- my understanding, I've talked to General Eberhart, commander
now of NORAD, and I think he's briefed the staff. And I think what he told the staff, what
he told me, as I recall, was that the pilots did -- at the appropriate point when the
authority to engage civilian airliners was given, that the pilots knew that fairly
quickly. I mean, it went down through the chain of command.
RUMSFELD: It was on a threat conference call that it was given, and everybody heard it
simultaneously. The question then would be -- the reason I am hesitant is because we went
through two or three iterations of the rules of engagement. And in the end, we
ended up delegating that authority to, at the lowest level, I believe, to two stars.
MYERS: Right.
RUMSFELD: And the pilot would then describe the situation to that level. To the extent
that level had time, they would come up to General Eberhart. To the extent Eberhart had
time, he would come up to me. And to the extent I had time, I might talk to the president,
which in fact, I did do on several occasions during the remainder of the day with respect
to international flights heading to this country that were squawking hijack.
GORELICK: I'm just trying to understand whether it is your understanding that the NORAD
pilots themselves, who were circling over Washington, as you referred to in your
statement, whether they knew that they had authority to shoot down a plane. And if you
don't know, it's fine to say that. You mentioned them in your statement, and I would like
to know if you know the answer.
RUMSFELD: I do not know what they thought. In fact, I haven't talked to any of the
pilots that were up there. I certainly was immediately concerned that we did know what
they thought they could do.
(Page 79 of 83)
RUMSFELD: And we began the process quite quickly of making changes to the standing
rules of engagement, Dick Myers and I did, and then issuing that. And we then went back
and revisited that question several times in the remaining week or two while we were still
at various stages of alert. And we have since done that in connection with several other
events such as the Prague summit.
GORELICK: As you know, we were not intending to address the issues of the day of in
this hearing. And it is the subject of a full additional hearing, and we may be back to
you with these questions with a more precise time line for you to look at. Thank you very
much.
KEAN: Thank you. Congressman Roemer?
ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to just start by thanking you, Secretary
Rumsfeld, General Myers and Secretary Wolfowitz for your strong leadership for our men and
women across the world in the armed services in the battles that they are fighting every
day to protect us from this jihadist threat. We are very appreciative of your time and
your statements and your recommendations here for the 9/11 commission. Secretary Rumsfeld,
my first question for you is a simple one. Did you consider Al Qaida to be a first-order
threat? And particularly in the spring and the summer of 2001, how did you practice this
priority?
RUMSFELD: I and others in the administration did consider it a serious threat. The
intelligence -- correction, it goes back through history, their prior behavior, the
statements that had been indicated by Senator Kerrey and the intelligence threat reports
that one would read as we went along drove one to a conclusion that they were active, that
they had been successful in some attacks and that they were planning, talking, chattering
and hoping to do various types of damage. I tried in my remarks to lay out how we
addressed the concern. One level was at the National Security Council level and the
planning and the process there. A second was to address the department as a whole and see
if we couldn't strengthen our special forces, strengthen our agility, develop the ability
to move faster, to move with smaller elements rather than large footprints, to...
ROEMER: But the special ops were not used during that time period, correct?
RUMSFELD: Not against Al Qaida. They were used in some other things, as I recall.
ROEMER: So with reference to Al Qaida...
RUMSFELD: But the changes to special ops are still taking place.
RUMSFELD: It will take probably another year for the process -- for them to move from a
supporting to a supported command requires them to develop the planning functions in key
locations around the world and to rearrange themselves, both with respect to their
organizational structure and their equipment.
ROEMER: Let me put this question this way. And you're one that likes metrics, and I
like metrics to try to measure what kind of effectiveness we're having. The Clinton
administration, fairly or unfairly, used a metric to say during the millennium that they
had a small group of the principals, secretary of defense, secretary of state, national
security adviser, the president of the United States, Mr. Clarke, that would meet almost
on a daily basis during that millennium and try to make sure that they were taking in
intelligence, responding to the terrorist threat, trying to push from the top down to the
bottom decision-making on how to counter Al Qaida. What was your method of trying to fight
Al Qaida from the DOD during the spring and summer when these spikes in this intelligence
were coming in? You've got some very capable people. I see Mr. Cambone sitting behind you
that is really very proficient in this. What were you doing? And how were you pushing that
out to the different departments, as the Clinton administration, for good or bad,
successfully or unsuccessfully. I'm not saying their model was the best one.
RUMSFELD: Well, we did it differently. You've mentioned the fact that they had a
principals meetings that met frequently. Our arrangement, as Secretary Powell mentioned
this morning, was Colin and Condi Rice and I talked every morning. We tended to talk after
our intelligence briefings. We are able to discuss the items that we felt were important
and needed action. We had lunch once a week, in addition to all of the principals
committee meetings and the National Security Council meetings. Internally, we did a great
deal with respect to Paul Wolfowitz and General Myers and our team, as it came on board,
in terms of focusing the department, but it was a different approach...
(Page 80 of 83)
ROEMER: To the metric of the Clinton administration, and again, we'll be talking to Mr.
Clarke tomorrow, probably grilling him on what the Clinton administration did right and
did wrong. One of the metrics again for the Clinton administration was principals meetings
and how many they had on a particular topic, right or wrong.
ROEMER: Were there principal meetings on Al Qaida and terrorism before September the
4th?
RUMSFELD: Well, there were certainly principals meetings where it was discussed.
Whether it was the sole topic or not, you have those records and you would know. I left
out...
ROEMER: Our records say no, that the first principals meeting on terrorism...
RUMSFELD: Just solely on that topic?
ROEMER: ... until September 4th.
RUMSFELD: I should add a couple of other things that were going on. In addition to
meeting with the president in the National Security Council meetings, I was meeting with
the president every week separately, and unquestionably, as General Meyers and I do it
together, almost always, and often, Secretary Wolfowitz. The other thing we did, was I
made a decision early on that the single most important thing we could do that would
benefit us in terms of these types of problems would be to develop an exceedingly close
link with the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community. And as a result,
George Tenet, who I knew and respected, and I started eating lunch with either Paul or
Dick Myers or Steve Cambone and one or two of his key people, depending on the topic, and
have done it consistently for the last three years. And we did it during that period. And
it has, in my view, been critically important to link those two institution together. And
I do believe they are as well linked together today as probably ever in history.
MYERS: I would say there was one other thing that the secretary did as well. That was
when developing the QDR, which we had to start right after the secretary came into office,
by law, was to develop, as part of our strategy, particularly for the first time, in my
memory, that we had to set aside forces for homeland defense. And it's the first time we
articulated that in our strategy, which set us up pretty well when we wanted to create
NORTHCOM, Northern Command, because we thought about it up to that point. But that was
just one example. There are lots of things we did in that area that were different.
RUMSFELD: Also, I forget the timing of it, but we worked to get the Congress to allow
us to establish an undersecretary for intelligence that Dr. Cambone now sits in.
ROEMER: With respect to Dr. Albright's testimony this morning, some of us were critical
of the Clinton administration's failure to respond to the USS Cole bombing. That took
place -- as you know, 17 sailors were killed -- on October 12th, 2000. They had several
months to deal with that. They had a CIA briefing in December, which was hedged, which
wanted to try to point command and control to Osama bin Laden, although they said Al Qaida
was responsible. Why didn't we take action in the Bush administration? I know you said in
your opening statement that it was old and stale.
ROEMER: The terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in 1993. And then they came back
seven years later and attacked the same World Trade Centers. Stale and old and patience
are words that I'm not sure -- at least patience is in the jihadist lexicon. Why don't we
-- why didn't we adopt that kind of approach earlier, to say we are going to make you pay
a price for this, four months from now, four years from now, we're going to go after your
camps? We're going to tell terrorists that come from Morocco or Algeria or other places,
we may not get bin Laden with a cruise missile, but we're going to maybe get some people
coming from other terrorist organizations. They're going to think twice before they come
to a sanctuary.
RUMSFELD: Well, I wish that were the case. You can hit their terrorist training camps
over and over and over and expend millions of dollars in U.S. weapons against targets that
are dirt and tents and accomplish next to nothing. From a cost-benefit ratio, it just
doesn't compute. Second, the bigger risk is that they will assume again that the United
States is, basically, that's all they can do is to pop a weapon into a training camp,
bounce the rubble another couple of times and then stop. And we've seen enough of the
terrorists that they have gone to school on us. They have watched what happened in
Somalia. They have watched various reactions to their activities and come to conclusion
about it. And to the extent they think you're weak, they'll go after you. And to the
extent they think you're not weak and you put pressure on them, you complicate their
lives. And right or wrong, I and many of us were concerned that another missile attack
after we get into office in February or March or April without having a policy, without
having a plan that was different, distinctly different would be a mistake and indeed, a
sign of weakness, not strength.
(Page 81 of 83)
ROEMER: We've just heard, Mr. Secretary, from many people who have said that while
these training camps may have been characterized as jungle gyms or playgrounds with
swings, rope swings on them, that other people said that they were human conveyer belts of
jihadists determined to kill Americans anywhere they could.
RUMSFELD: That's true.
ROEMER: So the cost-benefit ratio of a million dollar cruise missile to taking out some
people that can come kill others was one we just didn't consider, I don't think, in the
right kind of cost-benefit analysis in the long run. One final question: Again, Secretary
Wolfowitz, this is again to be fair, and I want to shoot straight with you on this. We
have Mr. Clarke coming up tomorrow. And he has a reference in his book to an April 30th
deputies meeting, where he claims -- and we want to know if this is accurate or not, so
that we can ask him the direct questions tomorrow -- he claims that in this meeting, when
they were talking about a plan to go forward to go after bin Laden and Al Qaida, that you
brought up the subject of Iraq and that you put too much attention on Iraq as a sponsor,
as a state sponsor of terrorism and not enough emphasis on Al Qaida as a transnational
sponsor of terrorism. I have just two comments or two questions on that. One would be: Is
that fairly accurate? Is his portrayal of that deputies meeting accurate at all or
accurate to some degree? And secondly, in an interagency meeting, where dialogue and
discussion of these things should take place, that's what the interagency process is
about, isn't that where these discussions should take place, that opinions should be
bounced back and forth and debate should be heated at times about the different threats to
the world?
WOLFOWITZ: Thanks for giving me a chance to comment. Before I do that, let me just make
a comment on the last exchange you had with Secretary Rumsfeld.
ROEMER: Please.
WOLFOWITZ: And it applies to quite a few comments, including Senator Gorton's question
about the luxury of seven months. I think there's a basic difficulty of understanding what
a plan really is. A plan is not a military option. Military option is to a plan what a
single play in football is to a whole game plan. And this notion that there's a single
thing that if we'd only done it, it would work, is like a Hail Mary pass in football,
which is what a desperate losing team does in the hope that maybe they can pull things off
at the end. A plan has got to anticipate what the enemy will do next. It has to anticipate
what the government of Pakistan will do. It has to anticipate what world reaction will be.
It has to go down many pathways. And it's not a timetable. No one can tell you what's
going to happen next. You have to be able to call plays and call audibles. And that's why
to put a plan together in seven months wasn't a long period of time, even if we had
everybody on board. It was actually rather fast. And I give you as an illustration, in
2002, in January, when the president said, OK, I want to see military options for Iraq, it
wasn't until nine months later, I believe, that he finally said, OK. I see that we have a
military option against Iraq. And that still wasn't a plan, because that only allowed him
to go to the United Nations and be prepared to use all necessary means. It wasn't a
decision to use all necessary means.
WOLFOWITZ: And General Franks' planning continued for another five or six months. So I
think there's, A, a failure to understand just how complex planning is. And we could get
into this. But to Senator Gorton, I fail to understand how anything done in 2001 in
Afghanistan would have prevented 9/11. And certainly, Congressman Roemer, the option you
present of killing a few relatively low-level Al Qaida in some camp in Afghanistan might
have been a worthy thing to do as part of a general plan, but it certainly wasn't going to
affect 9/11 except, as the secretary said, to make 9/11 look a retaliation. So let's keep
some clarity. But let me...
ROEMER: Perspective. The point is we're not saying that you could have prevented or
should have prevented with that particular one action, 9/11.
WOLFOWITZ: Let's be clear, the retaliation...
ROEMER: We're saying that there's no silver bullet. There are a host of options that
could have been out there.
WOLFOWITZ: The retaliation for the embassy bombings did nothing to prevent the attack
on the Cole, right?
ROEMER: There are a host of things. We're not just saying, you know, a cruise missile
going into Afghanistan. We're talking about the breadth of policy here, Northern Alliance,
covert operations...
WOLFOWITZ: And Congressman, that's exactly what took seven months.
ROEMER: ... cruise missiles.
WOLFOWITZ: We started in April with the notion of attriting (ph) the Taliban by
assisting the Northern Alliance.
ROEMER: OK, good enough.
(Page 82 of 83)
WOLFOWITZ: By September, we said the goal is to eliminate Afghanistan as a sanctuary
for Al Qaida, much more ambitious thing. With respect to Mr. Clark and let me say, I
haven't read the book yet. I was called by a reporter on the weekend with a quote from the
book attributed to me. I tried to get the book. It wasn't available in book stores. It was
only available to selected reporters. And I got it yesterday, but I did not have time to
read it in the last 24 hours. I'll get to it at some point. But with respect to the quote
that the reporter presented as having been put in my mouth, which was an objection to Mr.
Clark suggesting that ignoring the rhetoric of Al Qaida would be like ignoring Hitler's
rhetoric in Mein Kampf, I can't recall ever saying anything remotely like that. I don't
believe I could have. In fact, I frequently have said something more nearly the opposite
of what Clark attributes to me. I've often used that precise analogy of Hitler and Mein
Kampf as a reason why we should take threatening rhetoric seriously, particularly in the
case of terrorism and Saddam Hussein. So I am generally critical of the tendency to
dismiss threats as simply rhetoric. And I know that the quote Clark attributed to me does
not represent my views then or now. And that meeting was a long meeting about seven
different subjects, all of them basically related to Al Qaida and Afghanistan. By the way,
I know of at least one other instance of Mr. Clark's creative memory. Shortly after
September 11th, as part of his assertion that he had vigorously pursued the possibility of
Iraqi involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, he wrote in a memo that, and I
am quoting here, When the bombing happened, he focused on Iraq as the possible culprit
because of Iraqi involvement in the attempted assassination of President Bush in Kuwait
the same month, unquote.
WOLFOWITZ: In fact, the attempted assassination of President Bush happened two months
later. It just seems to be another instance where Mr. Clarke's memory is playing tricks...
ROEMER: You're doing pretty well for not having read the book, Paul. (LAUGHTER)
WOLFOWITZ: I read the quote.
ROEMER: Let me just say...
KEAN: To the Congressman, we have to move on to the next commissioner. ROEMER: OK. Let
me just say in conclusion, thank you for those remarks. And we do have Secretary Armitage
in the private interviews with us saying that he thought that the committee process had
not moved speedily before or after 9/11, the deputy meeting process and the process on a
seven-month or nine-month plan.
WOLFOWITZ: The government doesn't move fast enough in general. I agree with that.
RUMSFELD: Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment also? I want to make certain there's no
misunderstanding. I would have supported missile attacks on training camps anywhere, had I
believed that we could have achieved the goal that you suggest of killing jihadists. And
the issue is that what happens is frequently, we know that people are posted and they know
when things are going to happen. And people empty those camps from time to time. In fact,
we've seen reactions when ships or planes or missiles begin to go someplace, that they go
to school on that and move out. So the fact that a weapon costs a lot more than a training
camp is no reason not to do it. The only reason for not doing it is if you, as I
indicated, are working on a plan that you think is more comprehensive and you believe you
can do a better job a different way.
ROEMER: Thank you.
WOLFOWITZ: In case I wasn't clear, I was not dismissive of Al Qaida as a threat. The
whole meeting was about Al Qaida. I also believed that state support for terrorism was a
problem. But I have never been dismissive of Al Qaida, and I think precisely because I
think terrorism is such a serious problem, as I testified as early as my confirmation
hearing. ROEMER: Thank you.
KEAN: The last questioner from the commission is Secretary Lehman.
LEHMAN: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I hesitate to cite Mr. Clarke as an authority after
the last exchange. (LAUGHTER) But he is extremely critical, as has been reported, about
successive responses or lack of responses over the prior eight years from the Pentagon
when options -- not plans, but options -- were requested by the White House to retaliate
against Khobar, against various options.
(Page 83 of 83)
LEHMAN: You yourself are reported by another of about the same the credibility author
as being particularly unhappy about the options presented to you by the chiefs after 9/11.
I assume from what I read in the press that what is underway now in planning and moving
SOCOM from being a supporting to a supported staff moves in the direction of somewhat
institutionalizing the flexibility and the agility that you all demonstrated so
brilliantly in the Iraq war. And that leads to the question that our staff has been
looking into and others have recommended to us that perhaps the dichotomy that we have
between the Title 50 responsibilities of CIA and the Title 10 responsibilities of your
building is obsolete and the really probably SOCOM or what it evolves into may well be --
should be designated as the chosen instrument for transnational counterterrorism
particularly, and that the Title 50 issues be dealt with head on and CIA be gotten out of
the covert and special operations missions and have all of them under the authority of
SOCOM.
RUMSFELD: Let me make a couple of comments, Secretary Lehman. First, the reports that
I've been unhappy about military plans, Dick Myers will agree with me that that is
probably due to the plans and partly due to my -- the fact that I am genetically
impatient. And you can be sure that the men and women in the Department of Defense, in the
combatant commands and in the joint staff do a superb job. They really do a wonderful job.
When they bring up something to Dick Myers or to me, we do not accept it. We question it.
We push it. We probe it. We challenge it. We test it. And we force them to go back and
answer 50 other questions. And so it's not surprising that people say we're unhappy. I
think that the result of the superb job General Franks did with his team is an example of
the product.
RUMSFELD: And it was truly remarkable, what he did and what the Special Forces people
did when they were put in there in small numbers all across that country to work with the
local militias in Afghanistan and accomplish what they accomplished in such a short period
of time, with such precision and such skill and such courage. The question you ask, I
don't feel that I've spent enough time thinking about it to know how to answer your
question. It's a question that is probably fair to ask. The way we've solved our problems
is that if you take the agency and the Department of Defense, what we have done is
recognize there's a seam between us, just as there's a seam between our combatant commands
in the areas of responsibility, and that we have to address the seam. How do you do that?
And very often we do it where George Tenet will say, Look, we're going to do X, and we
need X number of your people to join our team. We don't have those competencies. And we'll
use the authorities that he has and some of our skill sets. It might be radio people, it
might be medical people, it might be something else. And they then execute an activity
with people on loan to them, functioning under their authority, and the reverse. There are
times when we do things under our authority and they second people to our activity. Now,
that's how you get around the problem. And it seems to me that it is imperfect, but life
is imperfect. There are always going to be seams, no matter how you organize or how you
arrange yourself. And you can have a lousy organizational arrangement, and you can have
authorizations that date back to the industrial age, and you have good people. And you can
find ways to solve a lot of those problems. And you can have a perfect organizational
arrangement and people that aren't working together well, and it's terrible. Dick, do you
want to comment on it?
MYERS: Well, you know, I probably haven't finished my thinking on this either, but
you're correct in terms of SOCOM, it was essentially a fifth service -- organize, train,
equip. What the secretary has recommended to the president and what the president has done
is made them operational. And so now they have the operational responsibility. It will
take some years for them to grow into that, but they're being pushed very hard to do that.
In terms of the relationship between the Department of Defense and the CIA in operations,
I don't view it as a zero-sum game. I think there's room in the battle space for lots of
players with different skills. The question is how do we put them together, I think was
what the secretary was talking about, and that teamwork. I can only speak for the time
that I've been here, but the teamwork is pretty darn good, actually.
LEHMAN: Thank you very much.
WOLFOWITZ: I would make one other comment on that, Secretary Lehman. The Special
Operations Command, besides having the operational responsibilities is also being provided
special authorities.
MYERS: And I will just stop there.
KEAN: Thank you very much. Thank you General Myers, Secretary Wolfowitz, Secretary
Rumsfeld. I might say this, Secretary Rumsfeld, I think people ought to know, has been
extraordinarily helpful to this commission from day one. The time he spent with us, the
time he spent with members of the commission, the time he spent with members of our staff
is very deeply appreciated. And I hope you allow us to come back to you as we move toward
the recommendation stage as we need your help and your wisdom.
RUMSFELD: Indeed we will. And thank you very much. What you're doing is enormously
important, and we wish you well.
KEAN: Thank you very much. Tomorrow, we'll turn our attention to the topic of
clandestine and covert action in furtherance of counterterrorism policy goals and national
counterterrorism policy coordination. It was a long day today. It's going to be longer
tomorrow; 8:30 the gavel will fall.
END
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